









The Doctrine of the Imago Dei in the 












A thesis  
presented to the University of Waterloo  
and Conrad Grebel University College 
in fulfilment of the  
thesis requirement for the degree of  





Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2008 
 











AUTHOR'S DECLARATION FOR ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION OF A THESIS 
 
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis.  This is a true copy of the thesis, 
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.   
 





































The Doctrine of the Imago Dei in the 





The soteriology of the English 14th century mystic Julian of Norwich moves in the 
direction of a hope for universal salvation.  The ground for this hope is established 
through Julian’s appropriation of the doctrine of the soul’s creation in the image of God, 
the imago dei.  Previous studies have primarily focussed on Augustine’s influence on 
Julian’s use of the imago dei doctrine.  While this has been fruitful, in order to better 
grasp the nuances of Julian’s anthropology and soteriology, it is essential to also attend to 
Cistercian influences.  In particular, William of St. Thierry’s notion of the will that 
remains godly in spite of sin and Aelred of Rievaulx’s writing on friendship provide 
important background to the development of Julian’s soteriology. 
 Interestingly, Julian very rarely explicitly mentions the term image of God.  
However, in her use of the Middle English word kynd, Julian clearly invokes the doctrine 
of the imago dei.  Further, the doctrine of the imago dei powerfully informs her 
imagination such that the trope of image may be seen behind important theological 
developments such as the correspondence between the human and the divine and her 
notions of  what is potentially occurring in the process of contemplation.  Close attention 
to the image tropes that structure Julian’s contemplation and her various usages of the 
word kynd reveals the complexity of Julian’s adaptation of the doctrine of the imago dei 
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The Doctrine of the Imago Dei in the 
Soteriology of Julian of Norwich 
 
In, Little Gidding, the concluding poem to the Four Quartets, T.S. Eliot introduced 
Julian of Norwich to the modern secular world through the words that may be considered the 
core of her visions and subsequent contemplations:  “Sin is behovely, but all shall be well, and 
all manner of thing shall be well”1.  In the context of Little Gidding  Julian is invoked as one 
who has sought to pierce the confusion of the simultaneity of the boundless love of God and the 
pervasive suffering of sin.  Indeed a concern to grasp sight of how it could be that all shall be 
well in light of the human plight may be said to be one of the driving forces of Julian's twenty 
year long contemplation of her sequence of 16 visions or showings. 
Julian’s efforts to understand the current reality of suffering in light of her showings is 
profoundly influenced by the doctrine of the soul’s creation in the image of God:  the imago dei 
doctrine.  The impact of this doctrine may be seen everywhere in Julian’s writing from the fine 
points of her theology to the grammatical and rhetorical structures of her thinking and 
expression.  In the following, I explore Julian’s appropriation of the imago dei doctrine and how 
it shapes her soteriology.  I contend that Julian expresses a hope for the salvation of all and 
examine how this hope is founded in her contemplation of her showings through the lens of the 
imago dei doctrine.   
A central component to my exploration of Julian’s appropriation of the doctrine of the 
imago dei consists in close attention to Julian’s use of metaphor and language itself.  There is a 
playfulness in Julian’s text in which the connotations of words is as important as their specific, 
                                                 
1 T.S. Eliot.  Four Quartets.  (London:  Faber and Faber, 1943) lines 166-168. 
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contextual denotations.  Such language play was of course a medieval commonplace; however, 
contemporary readings of medieval texts often fail to note the rich suggestiveness in medieval 
writers’ use of language.  The word kynd in Julian’s text is particularly rich in connotations and 
Julian’s usage of this word relates directly to the doctrine of the imago dei.  Consequently, the 
majority of my study of Julian’s use of language will focus on the word kynd. 
Another very important thread in the following study is my exploration of Cistercian 
influences on Julian’s appropriation of the imago dei doctrine.  Specifically, I look at Julian’s 
adaptation of notions and themes that are found in the writings of Bernard of Clairvaux, William 
of St. Thierry, and Aelred of Rievaulx.  While the influence of Cistercian writings on Julian’s 
theology is more or less accepted, in the current literature there is a relative absence of in-depth 
exploration of the particular nature of this influence.   
In spite of the significance of the doctrine of the imago dei in Julian’s soteriology, very 
little is written on the topic.  In fact, very little is written at all on the theology of Julian of 
Norwich.  Joan Nuth  recognizes that Julian’s reflections on the effects of divine love on the 
soul are rooted in her appropriation of the imago dei doctrine.  Of the major scholarship on 
Julian, Nuth writes most extensively on the place of this doctrine in Julian’s thinking, but Nuth 
prioritizes Augustine’s influence on Julian’s image theology.  Nuth does take into account the 
influence of Bernard of Clairvaux in terms of how Julian conceives of human will via the imago 
dei doctrine; however, she fails to give adequate attention to the writing of William of St. 
Thierry on the same subject.  The neglect of William of St. Thierry’s writings constitutes a 
significant gap given the parallels between his writings on the enduring godly will and Julian’s 
own reflections on the same.   
Grace Jantzen is another major contributor to the literature on the theology of Julian of 
Norwich.  The primary focus of Jantzen’s work involves a conceptualization of Julian as a 
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precursor of the modern feminist theologian.  Perhaps as a consequence, Jantzen generally 
alludes to Bernard of Clairvaux to demonstrate how Julian broke ways with the contemporary 
mystical theology.  However, in a brief reference to the doctrine of the soul being made in the 
image of God, Jantzen does recognize a parallel between Bernard and Julian in terms of their 
conceptions of the dignity accorded to the soul by this doctrine.  Beyond this, Jantzen does not 
consider Cistercian influences or the place of the imago dei doctrine in Julian’s theology.   
Kerrie Hide writes that the imago dei doctrine is foundational to Julian’s anthropology.  
Hide’s reflections on the imago dei doctrine in Julian’s theology emphasize the soul’s creation 
in the image of the trinity, the imago trinitatis.  While I agree that Julian’s image theology is 
consummated with her reflections on the imago trinitatis, I will show how further dimensions of 
the imago dei doctrine inform Julian’s theology and are crucial to understand in order to grasp 
the very significance of the imago trinitatis. 
Hide’s contribution is significant to my own study of Julian for the way that Hide stands 
out from previous scholarship both in her engagement with the implications of word play in 
Julian’s writing and in her sustained reflection on Julian’s soteriology.  Hide notes the 
significance of the multiple connotations of the word kynd in Julian’s writing and in my own 
study I have expanded on Hide’s observations of the meanings at play in this word.  While I am 
generally in agreement with Hide’s views on Julian’s soteriology, I contend that Hide is 
unjustifiably strident in her claim of Julian’s belief in universal salvation.  My own thought on 
this matter accords more closely with Jantzen’s circumspection in speaking rather of a hope. 
 
Outline 
A general progression of themes will be observed in this study.  As it happens, in the 
first chapter I consider the doctrine of the imago dei in terms of how Julian uses it to convey an 
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essential unity between God, the soul and, in some sense, creation itself.  In the second chapter I 
explore how themes of duality or doubleness emerge under the influence of metaphors of image.  
In the third chapter, I turn, appropriately, to the consideration of the imago trinitatis. 
In less general terms, in the first chapter I begin a sustained reflection on the significance 
of Julian’s use of the word kynd and its significance in Julian’s doctrine of the imago dei.  
Initially, my exploration of the word kynd is in terms of its primary meaning as nature.  My 
exploration of Julian’s Marian theology, a largely neglected dimension of her thought, sets the 
stage for exploring the relationship between nature and grace and the play between God’s 
imminence and transcendence in the work of salvation.   
Subsequently, I turn more specifically to the doctrine of the imago dei and begin to 
explore the significance of Julian’s preference of metaphors of God’s enclosure of the soul.  
Such metaphors and their significance will be explored throughout this paper.  Suffice it say for 
the time being that metaphors of enclosure convey a different sense of the security of our 
salvation. 
To conclude the first chapter, I explore how connotations of affection and friendship are 
also present in Julian’s use of the word kynd.  Here it will be pertinent to briefly explore 
parallels between Julian’s notions of friendship and those of Aelred of Rievaulx.  Afterwards, it 
will be possible to observe how notions of friendship and nature come into conversation under 
the banner of the doctrine of the imago dei, especially in the meaning of prayer. 
In the second chapter I explore a variety of notions of duality including contrariness, 
correspondence, inversion, and mirroring.  In this context I explore Julian’s notion of the 
bipartite nature of the soul and the phenomenon of wrath as not a divine expression, but rather a 
discordance between the sensual and substantial parts of the soul.  I then turn to explore Julian’s 
conception of the difference between God’s vision of the soul and the soul’s vision of itself and 
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the role of these two ways of seeing in the economy of salvation.   
In my exploration of various qualities of mirroring, including correspondence and 
inversion, I demonstrate how thoroughly the doctrine of the imago dei informs Julian’s 
imagination.  More importantly, I show how each of these themes constitutes a different 
perspective of the doctrine of the imago dei developing Julian’s inspired conception of the 
negotiation of duality and the initiation of a process of what she refers to as oneing. 
In the final chapter, I look at Julian’s understanding of the activity of the Trinity and the 
creation of the soul in the image of the Trinity.  The activity of the Trinity relates to both the 
shape of time and the nature of the soul.  The full Trinity is involved in the accomplishment of 
our salvation, as is each moment in time, past, present and future.  Accordingly, we are called to 
participate in our salvation through the faculties in which we are made in the image of God:  our 
memory, our reason, and our love.  In the imago trinitatis Julian essentially is able to give the 
fullest picture of how duality and suffering are overcome in reconciliation. 
In the conclusion of my thesis in the fourth chapter, I return to the underlying premise 
behind my examination of the doctrine of the imago dei in Julian’s soteriology:  her hope for the 
salvation of all.  In this final section I explore Julian’s hesitations regarding abandoning the 
Church’s teaching about the possibility of damnation.  Julian wants to be faithful to Church 
teaching and she also clearly sees its utility.  At the same time, she knows that in her visions she 
is given to know that there is no wrath in God and she never catches sight of either hell or 
purgatory.  I conclude with Julian’s instruction that a sense of delighting wonder is one of the 
soul’s debts to God.  I suggest that this debt is the hope for the salvation of all:  the hope that all 





Nature and the Imago Dei 
 
  A luminous window into Julian's meditations on the relationship between God's love 
and human sin and suffering is offered in her use of the word kynd and its derivatives (kyndely, 
kyndenesse).  The word may very well mark the most glaring example in the text of what is lost 
in the translation from Middle English.  The meanings carried by this word range from “nature” 
to “type” to “innate character” to “offspring” to “being good” to “being affectionate”2.  In what 
is generally considered the most authoritative translation of Julian's showings Edmund Colledge 
predominantly translates kynd as nature, but also translates it in terms of goodness or kindness.  
The translations are generally appropriate and fit the context accurately; however, the play of 
meanings is lost as the word is parsed out into different words that don’t have any apparent 
relationship to one another.  The loss here may seem incidental were it not for the fact that 
Julian clearly intends a play or mingling of meanings and attention to this play suggests 
important nuances of Julian's thought. 
 Each distinct context in which kynd is used is rich with meaning and merits individual 
attention.  If the word itself is a luminous window onto Julian's thinking, perhaps we may think 
of it as a stained glass window with many parts that come together to give an image that tells a 
story.  Each moment or element of the image given bears meaning within itself and then, when 
each falls together into conversation, a more comprehensive and coherent story is told.  In this 
chapter individual meanings associated with the word kynd will be explored and then we will 
see what stories emerge when they fall into play.  Close attention will be given especially to 
how the meanings of the word kynd play out against the background of Julian’s appropriation of 
                                                 
2The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1.  Edited by Lesley Brouwn (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993). 
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the doctrine of the imago dei.  
 When Julian uses the word kynd she most often seems to be referring to what we would 
call nature.  As noted, Colledge most frequently translates kynd as nature.  Julian's articulation 
of her view on human nature makes her particularly palatable to modern tastes.  The celebrated 
passages on the motherhood of God are one context in which Julian's estimation of human 
nature may be fruitfully explored.   
 The theme of motherhood first arises in Julian's visions concerning Mary the mother of 
God.  Although Julian’s references to Mary are relatively sparse, it is clear, as I will show, that 
the figure of Mary plays an important role for Julian in conceiving the activity of grace in and 
through nature.  The essence of the visions of Mary is summarized by Julian as a showing of 
“kynde loue contynued by grace” (8:18:5)3.  The love that Mary had for Jesus is the fullest 
expression of love we can now see and the intimacy of her connection to Jesus is explained both 
in terms of nature and grace.  The love that Mary has for Jesus is natural insofar as it is natural 
for a mother to love her child.  The beginnings of Mary's love for Jesus lie in what it is natural 
for her to do as a mother.  At least this is what first comes mind, but Julian also describes the 
love of God as that which is most fundamentally natural or kynde.  Consequently, the natural 
beginnings of Mary's love for Jesus are at once in her natural love for her child and in her love 
for God which is also described by Julian as natural.  The effect of refusing to distinguish in a 
definitive manner between these two types of love is to suggest that the yearning of the soul for 
God is as natural as the love of a mother for her child. 
 Mary's love is natural and it is “contynued by grace.”  The natural love of Mary is 
                                                 
3 References to Julian of Norwich's  Showings in the original Middle English are taken from the text edited by 
Edmund Colledge and James Walsh (Julian of Norwich.  A Book of Showings to the Anchoress Julian of 
Norwich:  Part Two, The Long Text, Appendix, Bibliography, Glossary, Index.  Edited by Colledge, E., and 
Walsh, J..  (Toronto:  Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978) (= BSAJN_.  Citations will be referenced 
by the number of the revelation; the number of the chapter; and the line number.  By example, (8: 18: 5) refers 
to the eighth revelation, chapter 18, line 5. 
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insufficient in itself and must also be lifted up or extended by the gift of grace.  The two are not 
at odds but in concert such that the supernatural gift of grace completes the natural gift given in 
creation.  Herein lies the reason that Mary's love surpasses that of any other:  her special and 
natural intimacy to Jesus as his mother is completed by the special grace given her to birth the 
Christ-child.  Julian clearly celebrates Mary's love as unique and primary; however, the very 
manner in which Mary stands apart in Julian's vision allows her to more strikingly signify the 
rootedness of every creature's love for God in nature and the completion of that love by God's 
grace.   
 Julian returns to the natural love (kynd loue) that exists between mother and child to 
touch on what may be expected of the love of God.  In the sixtieth chapter  Julian describes the 
motherliness of Jesus.  Julian's reflections here are clearly rooted in the earlier discourse on 
Mary's motherhood.  Similar language is used as Julian refers to the “moderhed of kynd loue” 
(14:60:5) and she explicitly alludes to her earlier showing of Mary.  In making the connection 
between the two showings explicit Julian invites the reader to note a movement from the kynd 
loue of the creature to the kynd loue of Jesus.  Julian draws out the analogy very prudently.   
 She begins by noting the proximity of the similitude in the analogy through her allusions 
to the earlier showing of Mary's motherhood and the love that is natural to created humanity.  
The incompleteness of the signifier, the love of a mother, is then emphasized first by noting that 
the office of motherhood is such that it could only be truly fulfilled by Jesus (16:60:17).  The 
distance between creaturely motherhood and Jesus' motherhood is then further accentuated by a 
series of contrasts:  through our mothers we are born to pain and dying, but through Jesus we are 
born to joy and eternal life (16:60:19-20); our mothers give us milk to drink but Jesus feeds us 
with himself (14:60:31);  our mothers bring us to their breasts but Jesus brings us into his breast 
through the wound in his side (14:60:38).  Through this series of contrasts the natural is 
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presented as a gifted beginning which nonetheless yearns for a completion that it cannot 
accomplish on its own.  Further, the contrast serves to preserve the transcendence of God while 
at the same time maintaining a kind of proximity or immanence.  The creaturely and the Creator 
are not confused and yet an important relationship and consequent possibility for analogy is 
maintained.   
 Once Julian has established distance she returns to proximity:  “For though it be so that 
oure bodely forthbrynggyng be but lytle, lowe and symple in regard of oure gostely forth 
brynggyng, yett it is he that doth it in the creaturys by whom that it is done” (14:60:49-51).  The 
series of buts is concluded by a yet.  Previously Julian drew such a gap between our current 
experience and what is spiritually accomplished in Christ and promised for eternity that one 
might be drawn to envision a lower level of reality that is completely disconnected from a 
higher spiritual level of reality.  However, Julian draws back from such a conclusion by 
recognizing the presence and participatory working of God through creation in all that is “feyer 
and good” (14:60:57).   
 The conclusion that Julian arrives at through the foregoing is as follows:  “Thus [Jesus] 
is our moder in kynde by the werkyng of grace in the lower perty, for loue of the hyer” 
(14:60:58-59). This passage requires some exposition.  Julian's reference to higher and lower 
parts refers to her conception of a bipartite soul divided into substance and sensuality.  The two 
are distinct but not separate.  Indeed, Julian refers to both in terms of our kynde or nature.  
Substance is the higher part of our kynde which is “knytte to god in the makyng” (57:14:16-17).  
Substance is that part of our nature that doesn't suffer change in the fall of humanity, but 
remains knit to God.  Kerrie Hide describes sensuality aptly when she emphasizes that it refers 
to our embodied experience in which we experience the painful effects of the fall, which is to 
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say that it is where we find ourselves lacking, incomplete and in need4.  This is not to say that 
sensuality is definitively separated from God for “god is knytt to oure kynde, whych is the lower 
party in oure flessch takyng” (57:14:19).  While substance is knit to God in its creation, God 
knits Godself to the soul in the incarnation of Jesus. 
 The higher and lower parts certainly refer to substance and sensuality; however,  Julian 
refrains from using these latter terms and as a result higher and lower is able to imply two planes 
of reality as well as two elements of the human soul.  Indeed the soul is implicitly given as a 
microcosm in which cosmic events are mirrored.  The tension between substance and sensuality 
is also the tension between spirit and matter and between Creator and creation.  In other words, 
the tension between the parts involves a tension in our nature and in the nature of the universe. 
 The larger part of Julian's exposition of the analogy between human motherhood and the 
motherhood of Jesus involves an effort to distinguish the two. Julian does so by emphasizing the 
degree to which divine love surpasses current human experiences of love.   The relationship of 
mother and child points to divine love but is not to be confused with it.  And yet, in the 
conclusion Julian clarifies that the signified is not altogether absent and separate from the 
signifier.  In other words, current human experience, in this context motherhood, doesn't simply 
point to the divine but also already in some manner participates in the life and being of the 
divine.  The “werkyng of grace” is the incarnation and in this accomplishment the lower part is 
lifted up such that Jesus becomes our “moder in kynde” which is to say our natural mother.  The 
pairing of nature and grace is important here inasmuch as it suggests that what is now natural is 
accomplished through grace:  grace and nature are distinct but entirely inseparable and in close 
concert. 
 When Julian writes that grace works in “the lower party for loue of the hyer” (14:60:59) 
                                                 
4Kerrie Hide.  Gifted Origins to Graced Fulfillment:  The Soteriology of Julian of Norwich.  (Minnesota:  The 
Liturgical Press, 2001) 84-86.  (=GO) 
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she orients all things.  God's enjoyment of the soul's substantial rootedness in Godself, which is 
the higher part, prompts God to lift up sensuality and ultimately remedy its experience of 
incompleteness.  God's work in the lower for love of the higher orients the lower to the higher.    
In this context it is also important to note that it is through our sensuality that we are able to 
experience the riches of our substance which flow into our sensuality by virtue of the 
incarnation and the renewing activity of the Holy Spirit.  With regard to the incarnation, Julian 
writes that “oure lower party the second parson hath taken, whych kynd furst to him was 
adyght” (14:57:21,22).  Adyght here means assigned5 which suggests that our sensual nature 
was destined from the beginning for Jesus' incarnation.  The flow of the riches of substance i
sensuality is again a microcosmic event mirroring a cosmic event:  in the same way that the 
riches of substance flow into sensuality so does the divine flow into creation.  We may conclude 
from this that as much as the meaning of the lower is found by reference to the higher, the lower 
becomes an opportunity for the experience of the riches of the higher.  As much as Julian 
emphasizes the distance between human experience and divine reality she also suggests a 
certain quality of mutuality in terms of each being oriented to the other in their respective 
manners. 
nto 
                                                
 In Julian's theology the movement from proximity to distance and back to proximity in 
the presentation of analogy as well as in the movement between grace and nature and higher and 
lower only fully make sense in light of the imago dei tradition.  This doctrine, especially popular 
in medieval mysticism, holds an important place in Julian's thinking and emerges particularly in 




5Julian of Norwich, BSAJ, 749. 
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Kyndenesse and the Imago Dei 
 The imago dei doctrine has its roots in both Eastern and Western Church Fathers and 
finds its place in the western tradition through Augustine's creative  appropriation of the 
doctrine6.  Julian's adoption of this notion from Augustine bears echoes of Bernard of Clairvaux 
and William of Saint Thierry7.  In exploring the doctrine of imago dei in Julian I will refer to 
Bernard of Clairvaux and William of Saint Thierry insofar as their writings on this notion 
illuminate Julian's text.  No systematic exposition of Bernard's writing on the imago dei will be 
found here.  Indeed, this would in any case be quite difficult inasmuch as Bernard writes about 
the imago dei differently in different texts.  Bernard himself comments on the diversity of his 
approaches to this doctrine in saying they are “different but not opposed, I think”8.  Likewise, 
Julian's own engagement with this doctrine may also be said to be somewhat diverse, which 
diversity serves to convey different perspectives on God's saving work and approaches to 
realizing this work. 
 In brief, the imago dei doctrine is based on the account of creation in Genesis 1:26 in 
which it is said that humanity is formed in the image and likeness of God.  In the imago dei 
tradition, as Bernard takes it up, the fall of humankind signifies a fall into unlikeness.  However, 
as much as the image may be obscured in the loss of likeness following the fall, the image itself 
is never lost.  With regard to the image that remains Bernard writes: 
 
God himself has desired divine glory and nobility to remain in the soul always so that it may have within it that 
which may be touched by the word, and moved to stay with him, or to return to him if it has slipped away9. 
                                                 
6Joan M. Nuth, Wisdom’s Daughter:  The Theology of Julian of Norwich.  (New York:  The Crossroad Publishing 
Company, 1991) 105. 
7 Note that in Julian’s time the writings of William of St. Thierry were widely read but under the name of his friend 
Bernard of Clairvaux.   
8Bernard McGinn,  The Growth of Mysticism:  Vol. II of The Presence of God:  A History of Western Christian 
Mysticism.  (New York:  The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1994) 168. (= GM) 
9Bernard of Clairvaux. “Sermon 83,” Bernard of Clairvaux:  Selected Works.  Translated by Evans, G.R..  (New 
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The remaining image enables us to hear and respond to the beckoning of God.  In commenting 
on William of Saint Thierry's appropriation of the doctrine of the imago dei, David Bell 
suggests that for William the remaining image signifies a latent participation in God that is 
always capable of being actualized10.    
 Julian rarely refers to the notion of the imago dei in explicit terms.  However, Julian's 
entire reflection on nature or kynd is fundamentally rooted in this doctrine.  When Julian writes 
that the soul is “evyr lyke to god in kynde,” (43:14:3) she is saying that the soul in its basic 
nature bears a quality of resemblance to God.  In the same passage she writes of how at this time 
we are unlike God due to sin.  This is clearly an articulation of the imago dei tradition in which 
likeness is lost due to sin, but the image nonetheless remains.  The word kynde refers here, as it 
does frequently elsewhere, to what Bernard and William speak of as the image of God. 
 The use of the word kynde, in the sense of nature, in place of image is not without basis 
in William or Bernard.  Bernard refers to God's image as a “a great gift in our nature”11.  The 
image of God as such is embedded in our very nature.  Indeed, the doctrine of the imago dei is 
first and foremost a statement concerning anthropology.  On the basis of the imago dei doctrine, 
William is able to say that “no vice is natural to man whereas virtue is”12.  The unlikeness into 
which we have fallen is not natural to us and from the depths of our very nature we are always 
being urged to return to God.  As will be seen, the theme of the unnaturalness of sin to human 
nature plays an important role in Julian's contemplations and so perhaps her use of kynde in 
place of image is informed by an intention to access a particular aspect of the imago dei 
                                                                                                                                                            
York:  Paulist Press, 1987) 271. (= SW) 
10David N.Bell,  The Image of Likeness:  The Augustinian Spirituality of William of St. Thierry.  (Michigan:  
Cistercian Publications, 1984) 33. 
11Bernard of Clairvaux,  Selected Works, 271.  
12William of Saint Thierry.  The Golden Epistle:  A Letter to the Brethren at Mont Dieu.   Translated by Berkely, 
T..  (Michigan:  Cistercian Publications, 1971) 84. 
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tradition. 
 While the use of the word kynde in place of image is rooted in the imago dei tradition 
itself, the manner in which Julian uses kynde elsewhere in her text connotes a certain alteration 
or variation on the tradition in her appropriation of it.  Elsewhere in Julian's text the word kynde 
is closely associated with God the Father, as when she is describing our dependency on the life 
and activity of the Trinity: 
 
For alle oure lyfe is in thre:  in the furst (we haue) oure beyng, in the seconde we haue our encresyng, and in the 
thyrd we haue oure fulfyllyng.  The furst is kynde, the seconde is mercy, the thyrde is grace (58:14:30-33). 
 
The allusion to the Father in “the furst” is of course obvious, and Julian makes it more explicit 
later on in her text.  The variation implicit in the association of kynde  with the Father  may be 
compared to Bernard and William's practice of relating the image of God to either the Trinity, as 
in Augustine's intellectual analogy,13 or to Christ who is referred to as the imago dei genita.  
One might argue that Julian's discourse around the word kynd depends on the imago dei 
tradition, but is not to be confused with it.  This solution surely has merit; however, it cannot be 
entirely satisfying due in part to how thoroughly Julian's writing on kynd  is rooted in the imago 
dei tradition.  Further, Julian's association of kynd with God the Father is no peripheral element 
of her theology, but is in fact central to her vision of the different parts each person of the 
Trinity play in the orchestration of salvation.  More will be said on the imago trinitatis and the 
roles of the Son and the Spirit in the accomplishment of salvation.   
 The saving work that the Father does, as kynde, is to ground our salvation.  When Julian 
refers to God as kynde she identifies God as the beginning and orienting principle from which 
we act when we are acting naturally.  Julian's identification of God as kynde also points to our 
                                                 
13The Trinity reflected in memoria, intellectus, and amor/voluntas. 
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fundamental dependence on God and even participation in God as a condition for our very 
existence14.  In the above quotation Julian relates being to nature in saying that “in the furst (we 
haue) oure beyng”  and then describing this first as kynde.  Being and nature are virtually 
conflated here with the result that Julian's notion of kynde implies both what we are and that we 
are. 
 The realization of our dependence on God for our ongoing existence signifies an 
important moment for Julian in the sequence of showings she was given.  In the vision of the 
hazelnut (or rather of a thing the size of a hazelnut) carefully held in God's hands, it is revealed 
to Julian that all things that have being last and will last by virtue of God's abiding love (1:5:1-
23).   The hazelnut vision thus adds to our sense of what is at play in Julian's conflation of being 
and nature.  The scope of what Julian intends in the use of the word kynde is so broad as to 
incorporate the fact of our being, the continuity of our being and the form of our being in terms 
of our orientation (telos) and how we are naturally inclined to act. 
 Indeed a concern for scope may very well be Julian's motivation in using the word  kynd 
instead of image.  On another occasion Julian associates nature and being when she writes that 
“God is kynd in his being” and she explains what she means by this when she adds “that 
goodnesse that is kynd, it is god” (14:62:12).  Julian is referring not simply to the goodness of a 
human act, but goodness wherever it occurs in God's creation and the derivation of this 
goodness from the very being of God.  In using kynde rather than image Julian is able to refer 
beyond the nature of the human soul to the nature of creation and God's activity therein.   
 In Julian's use of the term kynde there is a breadth and openness that is by no means 
incidental to her soteriology.  One of the ways that Julian guards this quality of openness and 
breadth is by generally avoiding describing God's saving work in terms of what is in the soul.  
                                                 
14See the vision of the hazelnut (1:5:9ff.). 
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When Bernard of Clairvaux writes about the imago dei it is most often as of a glory that remains 
in the soul after the fall.  In the tradition of Augustine, Bernard refers to the image of God in 
terms of the psychological structure of the mind.  While Julian doesn't by any means abandon 
this element of the imago dei tradition, and in fact makes explicit reference to it, she does not 
draw on it extensively.  Another element of the imago dei tradition, noted in William of St. 
Thierry's writing, implies a sense in which being made in the image of God involves a certain 
quality of participation in God that, however, remains to be realized or actualized15.  In Julian's 
contemplations it is clearly the latter that is emphasized. 
 The participation of the soul in God derives from the nature of its creation.  While the 
body is made of the earth the soul is made differently:   
 
But to the makyng of mannys soule he wolde take ryght nought, but made it.  And thus is the kynde made 
ryghtfully onyd to the maker, whych is substancyall kynde vnmade, that is god.  And therfore it is that ther may ne 
shall be ryght nought betwene god and mannis soul (14:53:45-49). 
 
When Julian writes that the soul is made from nothing she means that it is made from no created 
thing, but rather from the uncreated.  Our created nature or kynde derives from uncreated nature, 
which is to say God.  Both distinction and union are implied in this statement.  The soul is made 
and God is unmade and thus one is not the other.  At the same time, the fact that the soul is 
made from God signifies that there is a certain continuity between the soul and God.  By the 
manner of its making, the soul is “rightfully onyd” to its maker.  Julian introduces the above 
passage in writing that the soul is “made of god and in the same poynte knyte to god” 
(14:53:40).  God is the fabric of our being and out of God we are knit.  The notion of knitting 
nicely conveys a process of creation in which the new evolves out of an intertwining of one with 
                                                 
15Bell, IR, 115. 
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another.  As a result of this process of creation, Julian contends that it is impossible to conceive 
of separation between the human soul and God.  The very process of the soul's creation involves 
an interweaving of natures. 
 Julian's assertion that the soul is made out of God belongs of course to the imago dei 
tradition.  In some expressions of the tradition the image of God is referred to as a treasure 
hidden in the soil, obscured by earth.  For Augustine the image of God is found in the structure 
of the soul as memoria, intellectus, and voluntas/amor.  Julian certainly draws on these aspects 
of the tradition; however, in considering the remnant of proximity Julian tends not to emphasize 
God's image in the soul.  Julian writes that the substance of our soul is “evyr kepte one in hym, 
hole and safe without ende” (14:45:1,2).  The substance of the soul is not secure so much 
because God remains in it, but because the substance of the soul remains in God.   
 With regard to the soul's original orientation to God (central to the imago dei tradition) 
metaphors of enclosure clearly dominate.  As a quick survey of metaphors favoured by Julian 
one might take note of the image of creation held hazelnut-like in God's hand, the image of God 
enclosing the soul and body like the flesh enclosing bones and the trunk enclosing the heart, the 
image of God as clothes covering the body and finally the image of a child enclosed in the 
mother's arms and even womb.  Each of these images, especially the last, are natural images that 
convey Julian's sense of nature as more than an inner orientation to God, but an environment in 
which we are originally held and kept by God. 
 To clarify, Julian does not suggest that the soul is not made in God's image nor does she 
suggest that this is not of decisive significance.  She writes, 
 
For he hath no dispite of that he made, ne hath no disdeyne to serue vs at the symplest office that to oure body 
longyth in kynde, for loue fo the soule that he made to his awne lycknesse.  Fo as the body is cladd in the cloth and 
the flessch in the skynne, and the bonys in the flessch, and the harte in the bowke, so ar we, soule and body cladd  
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and enclosydde in the goodnes of god  (1:6:39-44). 
 
God cares for the body and loves the soul inasmuch as the soul is a reflection of God's goodness.  
Interestingly, Julian writes of the soul's likeness to God in the context of its enclosure in the 
body.  Julian expands this incidental image of enclosure to allegorically indicate the intimacy 
with which we are held or enclosed in the goodness of God, soul and body.  In what is perhaps 
the most explicit reference to the soul's creation in the image of God, Julian quickly shifts to an 
emphasis on the sense in which the soul is contained in God and in doing so she demonstrates 
her preference for metaphors of enclosure.  Julian is not including one aspect of the imago dei 
doctrine to the exclusion of the other, but choosing which aspects of the tradition to emphasize 
to convey the essence of her showings. 
 In Julian's use of the word kynde in terms of nature there is generally conveyed a sense 
of enclosure in God.  The kyndenesse of the mother is to hold her child, either in her womb or 
arms.  Our kyndly substance is always held in God.  Julian identifies God in terms of kynd when 
she writes that “God is kynd in his being” (14:62:13) and adds that God is “very fader and very 
modyr of kyndys” (14:62:15).  All kyndys originate from God who is kynd in his being.  There is 
something of the neo-platonic influence on the doctrine of the imago dei evident here in terms of 
an allusion to an ideal Kynd from whom all kyndys emerge and of whom all kyndys retain a 
trace.  However, for Julian, the distance of the origin and the sense of exile from the ideal, 
which characterize the neo-platonic tradition, is mitigated by the remaining of our kyndly 
substance in God even in our emergence and fall. The God who is “kynd in his being” is the 
origin of  kyndys and at the same time continues to hold our kyndly substance within. 
 Often in the imago dei tradition the image of God in the soul is treated as a latent 
possibility for the return of an exiled soul.  In locating the substance of the soul in God Julian 
significantly moderates the degree to which human beings are seen as in exile.  Further, the 
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possibility for return does not consist in a vague memory, but in the soul's ongoing enclosure in 
God which implies a more profound sense of the proximity of God and perhaps even a different 
quality of hope in salvation.  In order to more fully understand the proximity of God in Julian's 
soteriology, it will be pertinent to explore another sense of the word kynd. 
 
The Kyndnesse of Friendship 
 Attendant to the imago dei doctrine is the notion of like desiring like:  humans desire the 
God in whose image they are made and God desires humanity in whom God recognizes 
Godself16.  The consummation of this desire is the unitas spiritus:  union in willing.  In the 
struggle to understand the nature of the union between the soul and God Bernard concludes that 
it is a complete agreement of the creaturely will with the will of the Creator17.  Bernard and 
William both find clues to understanding the mutuality of attraction and the harmony of wills in 
the human-divine relationship in all kinds of human relationships.  A third Cistercian, Aelred of 
Rievaulx, adds a new dimension to this understanding of mutual love in his creative 
transposition of Cicero's theory on friendship into the Christian context18.   
 A few basic themes in Aelred's own treatise On Spiritual Friendship will be important to 
consider briefly before returning to further contemplation of Julian's concept of kynde.  First, 
Aelred suggests that the desire for friendship is rooted in nature and is a trace of the unity that 
describes God's own being19. Ultimately friendship is rooted in God and in fact Aelred goes so 
far as to put forth the notion that “God is friendship”20.  The purpose of this echo of John is to 
establish God's overarching intent for creation both in terms of teleology and ontology:  
                                                 
16 Etienne Gilson,  The Mystical Theology of St. Bernard.  (London:  Sheed and Ward, 1940) 118. 
17McGinn, GM 214ff.. 
18Bernard McGinn, GM, 318.  




friendship is a good conducive to spiritual development and an end in itself.   
 Two further aspects of friendship in Aelred will be fruitful to consider alongside Julian's 
text.  First, the nature of friendship involves an attraction between two that bear a quality of 
likeness to one another.  Friends share similarities in terms of manner of life, morals and 
pursuits21.  Finally, a friend is one who endures one's defects and works to cure them22.  Indeed 
in friendship each communicates his or her qualities to the other such that all are made equal23. 
 Julian comes close to repeating Aelred's statement that “God is friendship” when she 
writes, 
 
For I saw full truly that alle oure endlesse frenschypp, oure stede, our lyfe, and oure beyng is in god (14:49:23,24). 
 
This passage is written in the context of a reflection on our constant sinning. “Oure endlesse 
frenschypp” reflects the sense in which God does not abandon us in our sinning.  This means 
that God continues to love us, remaining true to a bond of friendship, but it also conveys the 
sense in which we are kept whole in God when we are divided against ourselves, in acting 
contrary to our deepest nature.  The sense in which our essential unity is preserved in God 
reflects the manner in which the friend communicates qualities to the friend in need.  Friendship 
is endless in God because God is never at odds with Godself and further, according to Aelred, 
God wishes to communicate this quality.  The medicine that treats our division against ourselves 
is God's own inherent unity and ongoing friendship.  More fundamentally, the very condition for 
our healing and being made whole again lies in the fact that in God's endless friendship we are, 
in some sense kept whole. 
 The statement that “oure endlesse frenschypp” is in God bears an unmistakable reference 
                                                 
21Ibid, 60. 
22 Ibid, 55. 
23Ibid, 114. 
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to Julian's earlier reflection on our “kyndely substance, whych is evyr kepte one in hym, hole 
and safe, without ende” (14:45:1).  The fact that “kyndely substance” is kept whole “without 
ende” in God describes “endlesse frenschypp” in God.  The effect of God's friendship is to keep 
us whole in Godself.  Further, friendship is associated with kynde by falling into its category.  In 
the immediate context, friendship is found in God with our stede, which is to say our place, our 
life and our being.  Elsewhere Julian refers to stede as kyndly stede (14:60:4) or our natural 
place.  The connection between life and nature is obvious.  The near conflation of being and 
nature has already been remarked upon and Julian's comment that “God is kynd in his being” 
may be recalled to secure the intimacy of kynd in the category. 
 The introduction of friendship into the category of kynd situates it in the category of 
things in which God communicates God's nature and keeps human beings intimate in God in 
some fashion.  The presence of friendship in this category describes our inhering in God as a 
friendship with God and friendship with God as inhering in God.  The fact that friendship is in 
the same category as kynd suggests that it is itself natural and that it is both an original and 
ongoing reality.   
 The likeness to God in kynde (14:43:2) is a condition for friendship with God, in terms 
of the attraction of like to like.  The remaining of our kyndly substance in God describes how in 
our friendship with God we are lifted up by the communion of the higher nature of the Friend.  
Friendship belongs in the category of kynd insofar as it is possible to see it as both an element of 
the phenomenon of the inhering of our kyndly substance in God and a description of that 
phenomenon. 
 Friendship belongs in the category of kynd in the sense of nature, but the word kynd is 
also used in a more direct way to connote the quality of affection that exists between friends.  
Julian refers to a “kynde (yernyng) of the sowle by the touchyng of the holie ghost” (1:5:36).  
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The yearning of the soul is the affectionate yearning for the friend whose relationship is an end 
in itself.  The relationship of affection is initiated by the 
 touching of the Holy Spirit.  Touching here conveys the quality of the intimacy and the 
familiarity of the relationship. 
 Before continuing with the allusions to friendship in the word kynd a detour to another 
word associated with friendship is of importance.  The word is lyke and it is of interest because 
it is not unlike the word kynd in terms of its semantic richness.  Indeed Julian plays with this 
word almost as much as she does with kynd.   The word of course signifies affection and in this 
context it is poignant to recall the text in which Julian perceives Jesus' will to make all creatures 
share with him in his love for Mary.  She writes,  “He wylle make alle other creatures to loue 
and to lycke that creature that he lovyth so much” (11:25:33-34).  The sense here is of a close 
friendship between Mary and Jesus which is special but not exclusive:  Jesus desires to invite all 
creatures to participate in and enjoy this friendship. 
 With regard to the enjoyment of friendship it is noteworthy that the word lyke also 
connotes joy and delight.  Another expression of Jesus' will that Julian notes is that “the lyking 
of oure saluacion be lyke to the joy that Christ hath of oure saluation” (9:23:27-28).  The lyking 
of our salvation refers to the delight that we take in our salvation.  This lyking is to be lyke the 
joy that Jesus himself takes in our salvation.  Julian's play on the double-meaning of the word 
lyke has a serious intent.  The manner in which she draws attention to the multiple meanings of 
the word lyke is to suggest a significance in the play of meanings.  In the likeness between the 
soul and Jesus, delight is to be understood.  In the delighting in salvation is to be understood a 
participation in likeness.  The lyking that is shared in the friendship with Jesus is a delight and a 
making-like. 
 While Aelred's reflections on friendship refer to human friendships that affect and even 
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cultivate a friendship with Jesus, Julian's use of the motif of friendship tends to  focus on 
friendship with God.  Nonetheless, Aelred's notions of friendship and its effects are still to be 
read in Julian's discourse even if they are to be more immediately transposed to the relationship 
with God.  
 The meditation on friendship in Julian's text counteracts the threat of despairing in sin.  
Julian encourages reflection on human wretchedness, as do all masters of the spiritual life in the 
Middle Ages; however, she is quick to note that these reflections can go wrong and be used by 
the devil to tempt people into despair.  As much as we need to be aware of both our fallenness 
and capacity to fall, so much more important is it for us to  keep in mind, “the blessydfull 
beholdyng of oure evyrlastyng frende” (16:76:43).  The friend is of course Jesus and while we 
are weighed down by reflections on sin, the reflection on our friendship with Jesus lifts us up. 
 Like the friend in Aelred's Spiritual Friendship, Jesus is one who counsels us when we 
are in sin and Julian sees that the essence of this counsel is as follows, 
 
that we holde vs with hym, and fasten vs homely to hym evyr more, in what state so ever we been.  For whether we 
be foule or clene, we are evyr one in his lovyng (16:76:27,28). 
 
The likeness of the friend, the endurance of defects, and the communion of a higher state are all 
implicit in this short passage on Jesus' friendship.  The counsel of the Friend is to stay close to 
the Friend in whom one is always held as the same.  There is a clear sense here in which the 
constancy of the friendship of Jesus recalls us in our sin to whom we most fundamentally are 
and in so doing effectively lifts us up and cures us of our ills.   
 Friendship frames the context of the divine response to human sin and to the appropriate 
response on the human part to the divine initiative: 
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and what tyme that we falle into synne and leue the mynde of hym and the kepyng of oure owne soule, than beryth 
Cryst a loone alle the charge of vs.  And thus stondyth he monyng and mornyng.  Than longyth it to vs for 
reverence and kyndnesse to turne vs hastely to oure lorde and lett hym nott aloone (16:80:32-36). 
 
The image of Christ and the soul here is as of two friends who have embarked on a joint 
venture.  Indeed, embarking on a joint venture is in the very nature of friendship in the sense of 
the shared pursuits that Aelred mentions. When the soul falls into sin Christ is left to carry the 
whole burden of the venture.  In Christ carrying the whole “charge” there is the sense of a friend 
carrying the burden of the other.  The divine response following the fall into sin is not the 
judge's condemnation, but the friend's painful sense of abandonment.  The human response that 
is stressed in this context is not mortification, but simply the return to the side of the friend.  We 
owe this response to the mourning of Christ out of the bonds of friendship.  It is noteworthy here 
that Julian refers to sin as “vnkynde” (14:63:16).  An obvious play on words occurs here such 
that it is implied that lack of affection or courtesy is unnatural24.  Elsewhere Christ is referred to 
as our sovereign friend (16:76:25) and so reverence is another element of what is owed in the 
return to friendship; however, the predominant debt in this context involves that of affection.  
The response to the mourning of Christ over our sin is to be a response of kyndnesse which is to 
a quality of affection, consideration and even compassion in the face of the suffering of a friend.   
 The yearning of the soul for God and the moaning of Jesus for union are overwhelmingly 
erotic images which would seem to be more at home in the bridal mysticism that also finds a 
place in Julian's text and so it is noteworthy that Julian uses the word kynd either in place of love 
or in addition to love.  Julian's use of the word kynd or kyndnesse invokes notions of friendship 
and a sense of the soul working together with God or in communion with God in the outworking 
of salvation rather than the passive sense of being ravished as is often implied in bridal 
                                                 
24Kerrie Hide cites Hugh White's observation that in Piers Plowman, which is contemporaneous with Julian's 
Showings a similar play is made on the word kynd such that it signifies both nature and kindness. 
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mysticism.  Reflection on friendship here offers a different perspective on sin especially with 
regard to the divine response to sin and the ensuing response called forth in humans.  The 
metaphor of friendship does not supplant bridal mysticism, but adds another dimension that 
enriches our sense of our current state and destiny.   
 
Meaning In the Play of Meanings 
 In the foregoing I have tried to show how the word kynd takes on quite distinct meanings 
in different contexts.  The shortcoming of this approach is that there is hardly a single use of the 
word kynd in Julian's text in which it is not fruitful to consider multiple meanings and the 
bearing of different meanings on one another.  
 Each passage which I have drawn on to elicit one or the other meaning of kynd in 
isolation of another meaning deserves revisiting so as to reinvest it with the depth and richness it 
derives from the actual intersection of meanings.  In the following I will return to a few 
particularly rich and dynamic instances of linguistic play. 
 In the section above I demonstrated how the inherence in God of both our friendship 
with God and our natural or kyndly substance describes a particular moment or aspect of God's 
saving work.  In this context the two are so closely related that it is possible to say that our 
substantial nature is fundamentally marked by friendship with God.  This is such a powerful 
theme in Julian's text that the word kynd should never be understood in terms of nature without 
at the same time having in mind the affection of friendship and vice versa. 
 Indeed, Julian very rarely uses the word kynd such that only one sense of the word is to 
be understood.  The manner in which she calls forth multiple meanings is such that one 
comments on and completes the thought of the other through the presentation of an alternative 
perspective.  As an example, it will be fruitful to reconsider the response of kyndnesse to the 
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moaning of Jesus in the passage quoted above (16:80:32-36).  As noted, the primary meaning of 
kyndnesse in this passage involves a feeling of affection and compassion.  However, the term 
also conveys nature such that our response of turning back to Christ may be described as 
natural.  Julian's description of our sinning as “vnkynde” (14:63:16) or unnatural is meaningful 
in the context of the passage under consideration insofar as Julian here suggests that sinning 
involves not being mindful of Jesus and not taking care of our own souls.  The failure to take 
care of our own souls suggests that in sin we go out from ourselves and forget ourselves even as 
we forget Jesus.  When Jesus bears our charge, which is the keeping or care of our soul, a 
substitution occurs such that Jesus takes our place in doing for us that which it belongs to us, by 
our nature, to do for ourselves.  Even Jesus' mourning may be seen as the lament that should in 
fact be ours for falling from our natural state.  Consequently, our response of return may be 
considered a natural response in the sense that it involves a return to our own selves and to our 
natural place by the side of Jesus.    
 The immediate meaning of friendship and the more nuanced theological and 
philosophical understanding of friendship and nature are both suggested in kyndnesse.  By rights 
of our friendship we ought to be kind to Christ who is painfully yearning for us.  We also owe 
this to Christ in the same way we owe it to ourselves:  it belongs to who we are to respond to 
Christ's call to realize ever more fully our union with him.  
 
Kynd Love 
 Earlier the kynd love of the mother was explored and elsewhere Julian refers to the kynd 
love of the soul (14:55:14).  Julian frequently uses the word kynd to qualify love.  In relation to 
Mary's love the word kynd certainly can be seen as indicating the ground of her love in her 
nature both as a mother and as a child of God herself.  Further meanings for the word kynd 
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suggest other dimensions of the nature of love and what it accomplishes.    
 In all forms of mysticism that may be truly called Christian love is at the core of the 
ascent to God and the realization of union with God.  Consequently when Julian refers to kynd 
love, the function of love in Christian mysticism is to be kept in mind.  Indeed, Julian's 
reference to the kynd love of Mary is itself a description of the degree to which Mary was united 
to Christ in love.  The love that ones us to Christ is “kynde loue contynued by grace”(8:18:5).  
The sense in which this love must be continued by grace will later be discussed.  This love is 
kynde in every sense of the word.  Primarily of course the reference is to the nature of our 
creation as kynd made from kynd unmade, which is to say our creation out of God.  It is only 
logical that the love that enables us to realize the union our kyndly substance enjoys with God 
should itself be named kynd.   
 The word kynd also signifies class, category and type.  The imago dei doctrine suggests 
that the fulfillment of our basic nature is to be conformed to Christ as the begotten image of 
God, the imago dei genita.  In this sense our goal or our end is divinization which is the 
elevation of our nature into a divine type25.  Love is kynd in the sense that it belongs to the 
category of divine reality and itself lifts up the soul into this reality. 
 Kynd love is of course also affectionate love which is to say the love that belongs to 
friendship.  As noted, the love of friendship is a love between two who share a certain quality of 
likeness in terms of values and goals.  The love of friends is rooted in likeness and moves 
towards greater realization of likeness through constancy in difficulty and the healing and 
restoration of sins.  
 Wherever the word kynd arises each of these connotations is to be heard.  Is love then 
natural, or is it affectionate, or is it that which makes us like, or is it that which lifts us into 
                                                 
25A distance is of course maintained insofar as we become like God, not God.   
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another class or type?  The question is of course rhetorical and serves to indicate the value of 
holding the word’s multiple meanings in conversation, as Julian surely intended. 
 
Kyndnesse and the Enduring Will in Prayer 
 The active realization of the likeness to God in kynde is for Julian the function of prayer.  
In order to fully grasp how prayer realizes the likeness in kynde it is essential to consider her 
appropriation of William of St. Thierry’s notion of the will that, even in the act of sin, does not 
consent to sinning.  William of St. Thierry argues that sin is limited in its capacity to obstruct 
our love of God.  While William recognizes that throughout our lives we can expect to continue 
to succumb to sin, there is a sense in which after a certain progression in spiritual life the fall 
into sin becomes more accidental than intentional.  In the accidental slips into sin, by fault of the 
flesh, the spirit does not consent to the sin, but continues to yearn for God26.  According to 
William, a great deal of work must be done before the will is so formed such that it no longer 
consents to sin.  Julian draws on William of St. Thierry's notion of the non-consenting will, but 
alters it significantly when she writes that “in ech soule that shall be safe is a godly wyll that 
nevyr assentyd to synne ne nevyr shall” (14:53:12,13).  In William the non-consenting will is 
related to the development of a new habit, whereas for Julian there is a sense in which the will 
never did consent to evil and never will, which suggests that the non-consenting will is not a 
matter of spiritual development, but is an ontological reality qualifying the soul from its very 
beginning.  The formula “in ech soule that shall be safe” is repeated a paragraph later when 
Julian writes “in ech kynde that hevyn shal be fulfyllyd with;”  however, in this second instance 
she does not refer directly to the will but to “a substance whych myght nevyr nor shulde be 
partyd from hym” (14:53:20,21).  The non-consenting will is implicitly situated in the substance 
                                                 
26Bell, IL, 191. 
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of the soul.  Julian thus radicalizes William's notion of the non-consenting will by associating it 
with the substance of the soul that is never separated from God.  
 As noted, for Julian the predominant manner in which we realize our union with God is 
through prayer.  Julian writes that “with his grace [prayer] makyth vs lyke to hym selfe in 
condescion as we be in kynde” (14:41:40,41).  The term condescion here alludes to that aspect 
of our life in which we find ourselves inconstant, forgetting our  roots in God, abandoning our 
companionship with Christ and falling into sin and blindness.  While in our condescion we are 
unlike God, in our kynde likeness is ongoing.  As noted above, in the very manner of our 
creation in our kynde we are knit to God.  The sense of kynde here is primarily that of nature.  
The word kynde  can also signify offspring; class, type, sort; and affectionate27.  The sense in 
which each of these meanings finds expression in kynde contributes to our understanding of 
Julian's adoption  of William of Saint Thierry's notion of the will that doesn't consent to sin.  
 Julian's ultimate concern and passion both in her contemplative life and in the reflection 
on the showings she was given centres on the onying (oneing; uniting; union) of the soul with 
God.  Julian may be seen making various approaches to this theme by means of reflecting on 
what it means that we are like God in kynde.  The ontological basis of likeness was considered 
in the context of speculation on the manner of the soul's creation.  Clearly Julian is not content 
to describe likeness and onying solely in terms of ontology.  Surely, part of the reason for her 
dissatisfaction with an exclusively ontological perspective on union lies in her Cistercian 
influences.  Both Bernard and William reflected extensively on the sense in which the soul 
could be said to be united to God.  Their conclusion is that union is a matter of a harmony of 
wills.  When one is unable to will anything but what God wills, then the soul is at one with God.  
Of course another sense in which the will is at the centre of the unitive process involves the role 
                                                 
27The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
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of love.  Love belongs to the faculty of willing, or as William prefers, it is the transformation of 
the will28.  In the form of love the will is fundamental to onying with God. 
 On the basis of her visions Julian has concluded that the soul is like God and even rooted 
in God in terms of its kynde.  The connotations of offspring and of class or type are clearly at 
play in reference to likeness insofar as these connotations themselves are suggestive of likeness.  
When Julian writes that God is “fader and moder of kyndys” there is the suggestion that our 
kynd is in some sense an offspring of God.  As an offspring of God our kynd is also in the class 
or category of God.  Julian is getting dangerously close to pantheism here and so she must 
qualify the likeness that kynd has with God.  When Julian adopts William's notion of the will 
that doesn't consent to sin there is a sense that she is using it as a qualification of ontological 
likeness.  The manner in which our substance is made of God is thus described in terms of a will 
that is at one with God in willing what God wills.  Due to the association of the will with the 
kyndly substance of the soul, which is in God from its creation, this will too must be seen as 
having nevyr consented to sin. 
 Finally, the connotation of the affection of friendship in the word kynde is worthwhile 
considering in this context.  When Julian writes that the soul is “evyr lyke to God in kynde” she 
is clearly referring to likeness in the nature of the soul; however, both the words lyke and kynde 
also allude to friendship.  The sense in which kynde alludes to friendship is of course in terms of 
affection and its connotation of kindness.  Once again, lyke connotes delight and affection as 
well as likeness.  Elsewhere in her play with the words kynd and lyke Julian invites the reader to 
keep multiple meanings in mind and when we bring this play to the passage in consideration 
something amusing happens.  If lyke is considered in terms of delight and kynde  is considered 
in terms of affection the assertion that the soul is “evyr lyke to god in kynde” may be read as the 
                                                 
28William of St. Thierry, GE, 88. 
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soul is ever delightful to God in affection.  The context of this passage suggests that this is not 
its primary meaning and the syntax of the sentence itself finally rebels against this 
interpretation.  However, the play that Julian has set in motion and continued to encourage 
causes this interpretation to sing somewhere in the background of the passage's primary 
meaning in a manner that serves as the commentary of a chorus. 
 The play of the motif of friendship in the chapter in which Julian presents the notion of 
the will that never consents to sin provides a further context for understanding Julian's adoption 
of this notion.  As I have shown, friendship involves a quality of likeness in terms of goals and 
values, which is to say a likeness in what is willed.  Julian's description of our friendship with 
God as endless is one more way in which she suggests that a likeness in willing has existed 
between God and the soul from the soul's very creation. 
 The manner in which in the substance of the soul the will is untarnished by sin is 
suggested in the passage in which Jesus is mourning and moaning for the soul that has gone 
astray (16:80:32-36).  In this passage, as it will be remembered, two friends, Jesus and the soul, 
have entered into a common journey with a shared goal.  The soul's departure from the journey 
is described in terms of falling and forgetting.  Neither of these actions imply intention and this 
suggests that the soul has not entirely chosen to abandon the way.  Further, when the soul falls 
into sin and forgets its companion, Jesus retains the common goal and waits in mourning for the 
soul to return to the shared journey.  The integrity of the way and the goal is not tarnished 
because Jesus keeps it, safeguarding the soul's original intention and waiting for the soul to 
reclaim it in return.  
 Prayer signifies the return of the soul to Jesus.  Julian writes that God is the ground of 
the activity of beseeching in prayer (14:41:11).  In this she is associating prayer with our kynd, 
which is also rooted in God, and also alluding to the notion of the will that does not consent to 
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sin29.   The sense in which prayer has its ground in God recalls William of Saint Thierry when 
he writes, 
 
If you know, be sure that you are foreknown; if you choose, be sure that you are chosen; if you believe, you were 
created for faith; and if you love, you were formed for love30. 
 
Knowledge, will, belief, and love are described here as activities that have their beginning  in 
God and witness to the predestination of the soul.  In a similar way, Julian writes that prayer is 
“a wytnesse that the soule wylle as god wyll, and comfortyth the conscience and ablyth man to 
grace” (14:43:4-6).  The will that doesn't consent to evil is either hidden or forgotten and then 
remembered in prayer as one prays for what God wills, which is of course ultimately the onying 
of the soul to God.  Prayer itself is a comfort insofar as it is an expression of the substance of 
our soul which is rooted in God.  In prayer we remember our kynd and bear witness to our 
identity. 
Julian's discussion of the love of Mary suggests a profound intertwining of nature and 
grace and a sense in which nature is originally oriented towards God.  The manner in which 
Julian progresses from the motherhood of Mary to offer motherhood in general as an analogy 
for God's love for the soul indicates a high estimation of nature that is tempered by an emphasis 
on the remaining necessity of grace.  The very manner in which Julian draws out the analogy of 
motherhood implies the imago dei tradition. 
 Julian's perception of the rootedness of our nature in God the Father by virtue of the 
soul's creation out of God describes an important aspect of her articulation of the imago dei 
                                                 
29Indeed Julian describes beseeching as a “lestyng wylle of the soule, onyd and fastenyd in to the wylle of oure 
lorde.” (14:41:31) 
30William of Saint Thierry.  Exposition on the Song of Songs.  Translated by Hart, M.C..  (Michigan:  Cistercian 
Publications, 1968) 54. 
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doctrine.  The discussion of friendship with God elaborates and qualifies the nature of union 
with God in terms of being at one in will.  Julian presents multiple perspectives on the nature of 
union and likeness in her showings and each perspective is prefigured in one of the multiple 
meanings of the word kynd.  The word kynd is thus pivotal in Julian's text and serves to mediate 
between conceptions of likeness and union.  The polysemeity of kynd constantly prompts 
dialogue between approaches such that one comments on another providing both context and 
elaboration.  The mediating work of the word kynd also involves tempering the claims of 
individual approaches by always alluding to others.  As such, notions of ontological likeness are 
tempered by notions of likeness in terms of love and a common will.  At the same time the 
notion of ontological likeness seems to prompt Julian's adaptation of William of St. Thierry's 
notion of the will that never consents to evil. 
 In the following chapter I will carry on the discussion of Julian's articulation of the 
imago dei doctrine in her notion of kynd by further exploring the manner in which  this doctrine 













Duality and the Imago Dei 
 
 Julian's imagination is thoroughly taken with the doctrine of the imago dei, and this is 
especially evident in the manner in which the structure of the metaphor itself echoes through her 
showings.  One of the implications of the metaphor of image is doubleness.  The metaphor of 
image introduces notions of mirroring which in turn suggests doubles.  In the mirror one finds a 
double of oneself.  A double is a pairing in which one appears to be the very image of the other.  
The trope of the mirror, or speculum, is a commonplace in medieval theology and clearly a trope 
that informs Julian’s imagination influencing the rhetorical structure of her argument as well as 
her conception of knowledge and the process of transformation.  In the following, each of these 
aspects of Julian’s thinking will be explored, but first it will be important to return to a unique 
element of Julian’s theology already briefly touched upon:  the double nature of the soul. 
 Julian writes, “[God's] forseeyng perpos in his endlesse wysdom wolde that we were 
doubyll” (14:56:58,59).  The doubleness of human experience lies in the division of the soul 
into substance and sensuality.  In the history of western mysticism this division is frequently 
lamented and often absolutized, perhaps especially in the streams of neo-platonism that run 
through Christianity.  Julian resists turning the doubles into dualities inasmuch as she recognizes 
in this doubleness the purpose of God and looks toward a higher fulfillment by means of this 
structure of the soul. 
 As much as the doubleness of the soul is ultimately a gift, in the present time it is the 
context for an alternation of experiences of suffering and joy.  To recapitulate, in the substance 
of our souls we are securely knitted to God while in our sensuality we suffer change and are 
vulnerable to temptation.  Julian also refers to substance and sensuality as the higher and lower 
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parts and she writes that in the higher part there is a godly will that never assents to evil while in 
the lower part there is a beastly will that can never will good.  The division of substance and 
sensuality thus also represents a division of the will.  Insofar as Julian closely associates sin and 
pain (see 13:27:33), the division of the will explains at the very least an aspect of the alternation 
of suffering and well-being.    
 The reason for the current experience of a “mervelous medelur both of wele and of woo” 
(14:52:9,10) is not simply due to the doubleness of substance and sensuality, but also to the 
location of sensuality between the falling of Adam and the completion of Christ’s work of 
reconciliation.  The ultimate sense in which we are doubly made is in our making and our 
“(geyn) makyng” (2:10:55) or, as she writes elsewhere our “agayne beyng” (14:42:45).  We are 
once made in our first creation when our substance was knitted to God and then made a second 
time when our sensuality was lifted up through the incarnation of Jesus.  Sensuality is in the 
process of being lifted up into its substance by virtue of Christ's dying and rising.  However, the 
process is of course not yet fulfilled and consequently in our sensuality we still experience the 
“myschef of Adams fallyng” (14:52:11) which is summarized by the pain and darkness of the 
sin into which we repeatedly fall.  At the same time, through its second making sensuality is 
enabled to “receyue giftes that leed vs to endlesse lyfe” (14:55:23).  In this sense the beastly will 
that can will no good also seems to be in the process of being reformed in the re-creation of 
sensuality.  The reception of the gifts of the Spirit is both a matter of enjoying the goodness of 
God and of participating in the process of being conformed to Christ. 
 Again there is no duality between substance and sensuality insofar as they are united in 
Christ and the process in which sensuality is lifted up into substance has in some sense begun.  
Sensuality is thus that part of the soul that is still in the process of being restored to God.  The 
experience of division is a consequence of the fact that the process of the integration of 
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substance and sensuality is not yet fulfilled. 
 Considering the division in terms of kynd in the sense of nature will be helpful.  As much 
as sensuality and substance signify two parts of the soul, so do they represent two aspects of our 
nature.  Substance may be considered the core of our created nature and, as noted, it is knit to 
God.  Our fundamental nature is thus to be in communion with God.  However, insofar as the 
beastly will is at play in our sensuality we find ourselves at odds with our most fundamental 
nature and our choices may be said to be unnatural.   
 Julian often refers to the state of unnatural division in the soul or in our nature in terms 
of “contraryousnes” (14:48:40).  To be clear, this term does not apply to the doubleness of 
sensuality and substance, but to the context in which the two are not in harmony.  Not all 
doubles are contrary in Julian's showings, and in fact it might be said that her general project 
either involves an effort to conceive the inherent unity in which oppositions are held and 
harmonized or to prophecy the manner in which the oppositions between which we are currently 
torn are finally lifted up and resolved.  Generally then Julian is more apt to conceive a fruitful 
tension between doubles than an irresolvable and final opposition.  However, there is a relation 
of contraryousnes that she is less prone to conceive as fruitful and that is the contraryousnes 
that is wrath. 
 To say that the opposition implied in wrath is entirely without fruitfulness would be 
inaccurate, for in Julian's economy of kynd and grace there is nothing that cannot in some way 
be turned to good.  Even the work of the devil is turned to the service of God (16:77:10-13). The 
perception of wrath is no different inasmuch as it prompts contrition and a desire for the 
amendment of the self (13:40:5-7).  However, the perception of wrath in God is, according to 
Julian, nothing more than an illusion.  Julian can admit a temporary quality of duality between 
suffering and joy and a few other doubles, but to her it is inconceivable that any quality of 
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opposition could exist between God and the soul or between God and anything for that matter.  
The reason for this is that the existence of all things is rooted in God's love and we would cease 
to exist in the event of an eclipse of this love by anger or wrath (14:49:1-20). 
 God is all love and wrath is contrary to love and so it is impossible for wrath to be in 
God due to God's very nature.  There is no contraryousnes in God and yet, Julian must concede, 
we nonetheless experience contraryousnes, so where does this experience originate?  Julian 
concludes that contraryousnes does indeed exist, but only in the human soul.  The experience of 
wrath consists in a “frowerdnes and contraryousnes to pees and loue” (14:48:8).  In his glossary 
of Middle English terms, Colledge defines frowerdnes as perversity31 which is to say that 
contraryousnes consists in a perversion of our basic nature or kynd.  Our kyndly substance is 
rooted in the love of God and so the experience of wrath can only be unnatural.  We are rooted 
in one who is all friendship and so the experience of enmity cannot be attributed to that one, but 
can only be a rebellion against our own origin and source. 
 A clue for the sense in which wrath is a perversion is suggested when Julian writes, 
 
And thefor we fayle oftymes of the syght of hym, and anon we falle in to oure selfe, and than finde we felyng of 
ryght nowght but the contraryous that is in oure selfe (14:47:40-42). 
 
When we lose sight of God we fall into ourselves and experience contraryousnes.  In his book 
on Bernard of Clairvaux, Etienne Gilson refers to the natural shape of the soul as straight and 
oriented towards God, while the distorted shape of the soul involves a curvature such that soul is 
turned in on itself.  Julian's passage implies this same curvature in the description of perversion 
as the shift from a gaze focused outwards to God to one that falls inward.  One might also say 
that in turning from the sight of God we fall into ourselves where our nature is to be in God.  In 
                                                 
31 Colledge and Walsh, BSAJ, 752. 
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opposing our nature, which is to live out of our rootedness in God, we are acting contrary to 
both ourselves and to God.  Wrath is the soul turned on itself.  “Vnpeas” (14:49:41) is the state 
of the soul turned in on itself away from the enclosing of divine love and peace, away from its 
rootedness in friendship. 
 As a result of the contraryousnes in the soul, the sense in which we are now caught 
between Adam's fall and Christ's rising, and the lack of harmony of substance and sensuality, 
our very experience is divided.  The sense of this division is well captured in the following 
passage: 
 
 And thus I sawe hym and sought him, and I had hym and wanted hym; and this is and should be our comyn 
workyng in this life, as to my sight (2:10:18-20).   
 
Our daily work involves the navigation of the polar experiences of proximity and distance; 
seeing and seeking and having and lacking.  In our substance we already in some sense enjoy 
the closeness of God and, by virtue of the incarnation that unites substance and sensuality, this 
quality of closeness flows down from substance into sensuality and thus into our experience.  At 
the same time, our re-formation or again-making is still in process and thus as much as we may, 
in fleeting moments, experience God’s closeness, we also are still in a time of seeking and lack 
the one we desire. 
 The soul is doubly made according to God's providence.  Julian knows from her 
showings that all will be well (13:27:13), but she also knows that in this time “we be alle in part 
trobelyd” (13:27:18).  The part that is troubled is our changeable sensuality in which we forget 
our rootedness in God and turn in towards ourselves.  At this time we experience 
contraryousnes in our doubleness. 
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The Double Vision 
 Just as humanity is doubly made so the vision through which the nature of our condition 
is to be regarded is likewise double.  In this case, however, the doubleness of vision relates to 
the two perspectives from which our condition may be viewed:  God's perspective and the 
human perspective.  The human perspective is affected by the fact that we conceive our world 
through changeable sensuality.  Consequently, we see some actions as good and some as evil 
(3:11:36), in relative terms from a shifting perspective.  Our vision is also limited by space and 
time.  Events come upon us suddenly and we are thus inclined to attribute what happens to 
chance (3:11:15). 
 God's sight is different on two related accounts.  First, God sees things from the 
perspective of eternity.  In terms of God's foresight the events that come upon us suddenly are in 
God without beginning.  In terms of the unfolding of events in time, they are led by God to their 
best conclusion or goal (3:11:11,12).  Thus, it ought to be said that nothing happens by chance 
for God both foresees all that happens and guides each event in its unfolding.  Second, God 
recognizes all that happens in terms of being the ultimate source.  Julian writes, “alle that hath 
beyng in kynd is of god's makyng, so is alle thyng that is done in properte of gods doyng” 
(3:11:38).  For Julian there is a sense in which God's hand in creation is not limited to the six 
days of creation, but is ongoing.  In setting things in motion, God remains in the movement and 
thus can in some sense be said to be in the doing of all that is done.  As much as the being of all 
things is by God's making and sustenance, so the doing of all things bears the mark of God and 
belongs to God. 
 In terms of the limitations of perspective due to the human lack of foresight, the human 
perspective may be said to be wrong.  However, there is another sense in which Julian writes 
about the two ways of seeing things in which she recognizes both as true in their own way:  “For 
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in the beholdyng of god we falle not, and in the beholdyng of oure selfe we stonde nott; and 
boyth these be soth, as to my syght, but the beholdyng of oure lord god is the higher sothnes” 
(16:82:30-32).  God sees us in terms of our rootedness in God in our kyndly substance and in 
terms of what is accomplished by Christ and fulfilled through the Holy Spirit.  On the other 
hand, we see ourselves in terms of our experience of repeatedly failing and falling into sin and 
blindness.  Here Julian is not so quick to dismiss the human perspective.  The truth of God's 
perspective does not cancel out the perspective of human beings in this context.  It must be 
noted that Julian's theology is a mystical theology and as such is both informed by the practice 
of a spiritual tradition and oriented to further informing that practice.  Consequently, Julian is 
conscientious in considering the practical, pastoral implications of her showings.  In this regard, 
Julian maintains that it is efficient and fruitful for us to hold both these perspectives at once.  
The awareness of our sinfulness is fruitful for the cultivation of shame, meekness and dread 
each of which have value in the contemplative life, as I will show further on.  The awareness of 
the fact that God does not see us as fallen is conducive to spiritual joy and the enjoyment of God 
(16:82:35-37).   
 While both God's seeing and human seeing are held to be true, they are not equal.  God's 
sight is the higher sight.  Further, Julian advises that we hold the higher vision more closely 
without losing sight of the lower vision.  This is of course a temporal solution for we will leave 
behind the lower vision when we are brought up above.  In the double vision Julian offers a 
model for how two apparently opposing notions can be simultaneously true.  The key is also 






 Another implication of the metaphor of image involves the prioritization of seeing as a 
vehicle for return to God.  Indeed for Julian metaphors of sight and blindness are fundamental to 
her theology, as is appropriate to one whose thought is inspired with references to the imago dei 
tradition and whose contemplations consist in an effort to understand and articulate a series of 
visions.  Consequently, it will be poignant to spend time considering what is at play in Julian's 
notion of seeing. 
 Of greatest concern to Julian is that special form of seeing that is referred to as 
beholding.  Hide cites the Middle English Dictionary in defining beholding as “looking, gazing, 
or seeing a visual appearance, applying the mind in thought, meditation, or contemplation, and 
being in a state of relationship or connection.”32  Medieval theory of knowledge is implicit to 
this definition of beholding especially in the association of relationship, connection, seeing and 
thinking.  In commenting on the theory of knowledge that William of St. Thierry both appeals to 
and develops, Bell refers to a sense in which cognition involves assimilation.   Knowing 
depends on some type of connaturality between subject and object and in the comprehension of 
the object the subject is in some sense conformed to the object33.  When we know something we 
penetrate it and assimilate it or intellectually incorporate it.  The process of natural knowing in 
which an object is grasped and assimilated into the mind is reversed in mystical knowing.  
William observes that while in natural knowing the intellect grasps its object, in mystical 
knowing one finds oneself grasped34. 
 In William of St. Thierry's theory of knowledge and indeed even simply in the range of 
meanings of beholding in Middle English, aspects of both loving and becoming are suggested.  
As I have noted, loving and friendship in the mystical tradition involve a process of becoming 
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like.  The relationship between beholding and loving in Julian's text become evident when she 
writes that “the more the soule seeth of god, the more she desyeryth hym by grace” 
(14:43:27,28).  In this passage Julian uses the word seeth instead of beholding, but the fact that 
the chapter in which this passage occurs concerns prayer suggests a quality of beholding in this 
seeing.  Julian doesn't seem to mean anything in using seeing at one moment and beholding the 
next.  If anything is meant in the alternation of these words, perhaps it would be the suggestion 
of the essential naturalness and simplicity of the sight of God, which sense might be lost in the 
technical implications of the word beholding.  In any case, in this passage a correspondence 
between an increase in sight and increase in desire may be noted.  Seeing is followed by a gift of 
increased desire for God. 
 A little further on in the same section quoted above Julian continues, “And whan we of 
his speciall grace pleynly beholde hym, seying none other, nedys then we folowe hym, and he 
drawyth vs to hym by loue” (14:43:35-37).  Seeing and beholding are used in this passage 
virtually interchangeably.  While in the previous passage the gift was desire, in this passage the 
gift is beholding, perhaps indicating a more profound quality of seeing.  Through the beholding 
we are drawn to God by love and in this is suggested the sense in which in mystical knowing the 
soul finds itself grasped by God.  In the age of science seeing takes on a quality of cold, 
objective distance.  None of this distance is implied in seeing as it occurs in Julian's text.  
Rather, spiritual seeing leads to a desire to get closer to the object.  Seeing here is not simply an 
activity of the individual, but must also be a gift, which is what Julian indicates when she refers 
to its development as a special grace.  The involvement of relationship in beholding occurs here 
on several levels.  First, seeing leads to desiring the other.  Second, a more profound level of 
seeing (“seyeng none other”) is a gift from another.  Third, the deepening of seeing creates a 
need to follow the one who thus draws us on by love.  Beholding and being drawn by love are 
 42
not to be confused here, and yet they appear to be inextricably involved in one another. 
 The involvement of loving and becoming in beholding is suggested when Julian writes, 
“And the soule that thus beholdyth, it makyth it lyke to him that is beholde, and ony(th) it in rest 
and in pease by his grace” (16:68:48,49).  Beholding here entails a sense of again making in 
which the one beholding becomes remade and conformed to the one beheld.  Being made like 
the one beheld of course consists in onying in God.   The sense in which beholding involves 
being drawn by God in love is here surpassed as beholding is consummated in onying with God, 
which is of course to be understood as a onying in love.  
 Beholding involves making the soul like God.  This beholding would seem to be both a 
gift and an activity of receiving.  The fact that Julian writes that beholding makes the soul like 
God suggests that in beholding the soul participates in some sense in its own re-creation.  At the 
same time, the onying that occurs in beholding is by the grace of God.   
 In another context Julian writes that in prayer one gives witness in the context of the 
experience of unlikeness to the soul's enduring likeness to God by virtue of a nature that is 
rooted in God and a will that is at one with God's will (14:43:1-6).  Julian writes that this 
witness is both a comfort to the soul and a type of preparation for the reception of grace.  
Witnessing and beholding involve both passive and active elements.  Witnessing is somehow 
involved in the restoration of the condition of unlikeness to likeness and beholding in some 
sense involves making the soul like to God.  Witnessing and beholding are of course different 
descriptions of the same thing.  In referring to beholding in terms of witnessing, Julian suggests 
the nature of the soul's activity in beholding.  The soul is active in realizing what God has done, 
is doing, and will do.  While realizing may appear to be passive, there is nonetheless a sense in 
which realizing involves a cooperation in the work of God.  This will perhaps become more 
apparent as we turn to look at the opposite of beholding:  blindness. 
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Blindness and Sin 
 Julian's showing of the parable of the Servant and the Lord (chapter 51) acts as the hub 
of her struggle to understand the nature of sin.  The glimpses she has of the nature of sin and its 
place in the divine economy are visually and narratively represented in this parable.  The 
anxious questions that led up to this showing cease following her reception of the showing, 
though it must be said that she doesn’t so much receive an answer as a different quality of hope 
in that which is left unknown. 
 In the vision of the servant and the lord Julian sees the servant standing faithfully by the 
side of his lord waiting to do his bidding.  The lord sends the servant out on an errand and the 
servant not only cheerfully goes but breaks into a run in his great enthusiasm.   As a result of his 
haste the servant falls into a dell and is greatly injured and stuck.  Julian tells the parable more 
than once and offers double interpretations of it that correspond to her double vision.  In her first 
interpretation, which is the only one that I will consider at this time, Julian identifies the servant 
as Adam and hence the fall into the dell as the fall of humankind.  It is noteworthy that the fall is 
the result not of a willful rebellion, but of a over-hasty zeal and it is significant that the lord at 
no time attaches blame to the servant for his fall.  Of greatest interest for the present purpose is 
the experience of the servant immediately after the fall.  The servant is hurt, bruised, alone, and 
most of all he has lost sight of his lord and is twisted such that he cannot turn and see him. 
 The servant's loss of sight is, not surprisingly, described as double by Julian.  First, the 
servant can no longer behold his lord.  Julian here insists that even in being turned from 
beholding his lord he nevertheless retains his good will.  Of course, Julian is alluding to her 
notion of the will that never consents to evil.  The second blindness lies in the fact that in spite 
of retaining his good will, the servant is blinded from knowing it.  In the time of the servant's 
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fall and ensuing blindness he never falls from the sight of God.  When the servant's will was lost 
from his own sight and knowing it was “kepte in gods syght” (14:51:107).  This keeping relates 
to the sense in which Jesus bears the “charge” of the soul who falls away from him and forgets 
him (16:80:32-36).  In the keeping of the servant's good will in the sight of the lord there is both 
a sense in which this good will remains at the heart of the servant's being and nature and a sense 
in which this good will is kept and safeguarded in the sight of the lord.  In losing sight of the 
lord's face the servant also loses sight of the way he is seen and this signifies a double blindness 
in which the servant cannot see the lord and simultaneously loses sight of who he most 
fundamentally is.   
  When Julian writes of a higher and lower vision,35 one in which we never fall and one 
in which we never stand, she is alluding to the parable of the Servant and the Lord and furthe
commenting on it.  The perspective of the fallen servant is necessary because in this we 
experience our great need for God and our need for reform.  The importance of keeping the 
higher vision closest relates to the sense in which beholding involves becoming.  In beholding 
God we are able to see ourselves in God's sight and we are thus reminded of who we most 
essentially are in terms of our deepest and most profound will in which we are at one with God.  
r 
                                                
 One of the shortcomings of Julian's reliance on metaphors of seeing, beholding and 
witnessing is that the role that the individual takes in working out his or her salvation can come 
to seem rather limited and even passive.  Indeed, there should be no mistake that Julian sees the 
accomplishment of our salvation largely in terms of God's activity.  Even here the metaphor of 
seeing predominates.  We are repeatedly losing sight of God, but God holds us and keeps us in 
God's sight.  The sense in which God's sight keeps us echoes the metaphors of enclosure and 
there is a sense in which we are able to see again by virtue of being continually held in God's 
 
35 Recall the earlier discussion of 16:82:30-32. 
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sight.  Nonetheless, the sense in which the soul does actively participate in its recreation is not 
to be underestimated.  In this context I will limit myself to demonstrating how seeing itself is 
not to be understood in isolation from other actions.  Julian writes that “as long as we be 
meddlyd with any part of synne we shall nevyr see cleerly the blessyd chere of God.  And the 
horyblyer and the grevowser that oure synnes be, the depper are we fro that tyme fro this 
blessyd syghte” (16:72:10-13).    The fact that we are unable to see either God or our own 
deepest will is a consequence of the choices we make and the consequent obscuring of  our 
godly will by our beastly will.   In the same regard seeing is also not to be understood in 
isolation from a life whose re-formation consists in a withdrawal from the things and choices 
that lead us away from our natural likeness. 
 The direction of causality in the relationship between blindness and sin is in fact not 
entirely clear in Julian's text.  In the passage above it would appear that sin causes blindness.  In 
another passage, Julian lists the causes for the frequency of falling and concludes with blindness 
as a cause arguing that “yf he saw god contynually, he shulde haue no myschevous felyng ne no 
maner steryng, no sorowyng that servyth to synne” (14:47:19-21).  Blindness is a cause for sin 
insofar as in beholding we are in a process of being made like God and even our feelings are 
uplifted such that the impulse to sin is absent.  The direction of causality is ultimately difficult to 
discern because the relationship between blindness and sin is circular.  In the same way, seeing 
and becoming through re-forming of life cannot be separated and in fact rotate on one another.  
The mystical vision makes an impression on the intellect and will such that one becomes more 
like God.  Becoming like God, or being worked into God, as Julian puts it, is a work in which 
human participation is integral.  Becoming like God is, as I have noted, also a condition for 
seeing God.  When we behold God, we are made more like God and the more we are made like, 
the more we behold.   When we sin we lose our sight and when we lose our sight we sin.  Julian 
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thus does not confuse realization or blindness with action and choice, but nor does she allow for 
one to be conceived without the other. 
 A final consideration in looking at the close relationship between sin and blindness 
involves the seeing of sin.  In terms of seeing sin itself, an important theme in Julian's showings 
lies in her assertion that she did not see sin in her showings.  When Julian is given a showing of 
the passion, presumably the consummation of the expression of human sinfulness, she does not 
see sin.  Julian concludes that sin cannot be seen because it doesn't have any substance of its 
own and no real participation in being (13:27:27).  Sin cannot be seen, the affect of sinful 
choices may be seen, which affect consists in pain (13:27:28).   
 While Julian asserts that sin itself cannot be seen, she nonetheless refers to the 
importance of seeing our sin.  When Julian refers to seeing our sin she is not talking about 
seeing sin itself, but of seeing ourselves in terms of our sinning.  Significantly even this seeing 
or beholding is a matter of grace:  “he of his curtesy mesuryth the syght to us; for it is so foule 
and so horryble that we shulde not endure to se it as it is” (16:78:21-22).  We do not see our sin 
on our own, but are given glimpses of our sinfulness to the degree that it is conducive to our 
amendment and healing.  Our sin is not shown to us as it is and when we are shown our sin, to a 
degree, it is in the light of God's mercy (16:78:4-5). 
 To summarize, sin and blindness are intimately related in a kind of circle of causation.  
The sin that is hedged by blindness cannot in itself be seen and even the horrible affects of sin 
on us cannot be seen by us except to the extent that God deigns it to be profitable to us. 
  
The Mirror 
 Doubles and images are unthinkable without allusion to mirrors.  Indeed, mirroring is 
another trope that organizes Julian's thought appearing everywhere from the conception of 
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correspondence between God and creature to the very structure of sentences in some cases. 
 One sense in which the trope of mirroring appears is in a theme that has already been 
alluded to in the discussion of the parable of the Servant and the Lord:  the relationship between 
knowledge of God and knowledge of the self.  As noted in the discussion of the parable, the 
deepest aspects of the soul's nature, which are forgotten in the fall, are always held in God's 
sight.  In the expression on God's face and the nature of his gaze much is shown.  The sight or 
gaze of God acts as a type of mirror in which the soul is able to see itself, especially that most 
fundamental aspect of itself it has forgotten.    
 God's sight functions as a mirror for the soul, but before this gaze may be met something 
else is necessary:  the mirror of faith.  Julian writes that “oure passyng lyvyng that we haue here 
in oure sensualyte knowyth nott what oure selfe is but in feyth” (14:46:1-2).  Oure passyng 
lyvyng refers to the constant experience of flux and change that the soul is subject to due to its 
sensuality.  In the state of flux, the soul is unable to retain sight of the eternal.  In the absence of 
this direct vision, faith offers a mirror to the soul of its eternal nature.  Julian in a sense inverts 
the more common notion that faith pertains only to God, when she offers the notion that in faith 
we first come to know ourselves and then pass on to knowing God.  It is noteworthy that in this 
context Julian says that full knowledge of the self is not possible in this life.  The soul that is 
created in the image of God can only fully know itself in the time of its full restoration to God in 
eternity when faith is transformed into the direct knowing of God.   
 The trope of mirroring can imply a division of real and unreal and an irremediable 
distance between the two.  To some degree, Julian overcomes this implication through 
introducing notions of mutuality.  As with Bernard of Clairvaux,36 Julian frequently suggests 
that the progression of knowledge involves a movement from the world into the soul and from 
                                                 
36See Bernard of Clairvaux's treatise On Love in Bernard of Clairvaux, SW. 
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the soul into God.  In the soul the image of God is found and the soul is able to study the image 
in itself so as to find its way to its source.  Julian's preference for envisioning the soul in God 
rather than God in the soul provides impetus for her to also offer an inversion of the process of 
development in knowing: 
 
For oure soule is so depe growndyd in god and so endlesly tresoryd that we may nott come to the knowyng ther of 
tylle we haue furst knowyng of god, whych is the maker to whome it is onyd (14:56:2-6). 
 
While Julian has elsewhere suggested that the journey begins with knowledge of the soul, she 
suggests that before knowledge of the soul is sought, there must come knowledge of God.  The 
logic of the route to God via God's image in the soul is that one begins with what is closest.  In 
agreement with this general logic, Julian nonetheless effects a reversal by saying that beginning 
the journey with what is closest means beginning with God for “god is more nerer to vs than 
oure soule” (14:56:11).  In one moment Julian advises that the soul can only be sought in God 
and the next she argues that God can only be sought in  the soul.  She sees in the soul a sign 
pointing to God and when she looks into the face of the Lord she finds something fundamental 
revealed about the soul.  Images reverberate back and forth like echoes such that one is always 
seen in the other.  In the shuffling of beginnings and endings in the journey a circularity and 
even a certain mutuality is suggested that puts the distance between image and source into 
question. 
 Julian is well aware that her reader is likely to be vexed by the fact that she has given 
two seemingly opposite accounts for the progression of knowledge and so she writes, “And thus 
by the gracious ledyng of the holy gost we shall know hym both in oone; whether we be steryd 
to know god or oure soule, it is both good and trew” (14:56:9-11).  Both in oone is a very 
strange expression and while it may not open itself to a clear and definitive exposition, one may 
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read in it an expression of the sense in which God and soul are both to be found in God and soul 
and God are both to be found in the soul.  Therefore, whether one is moved to begin with the 
soul or with God may not be of great consequence.  Julian here offers an example of how two 
seemingly opposite statements may simultaneously be true in terms of describing different 
aspects or outlooks on one complexly interwoven reality. 
 
Correspondence 
 In mirroring, movement in one place corresponds with movement in another.  A sense of 
some type of correspondence between the created and the Creator is at the heart of the imago dei 
tradition, though this correspondence is understood in different ways and to different degrees by 
those who have articulated the doctrine.  I will turn now to exploring how Julian conceives this 
correspondence or mirroring.   
 Natural goodness is at the core of the correspondence of God and soul.  In referring to 
the manner in which grace and mercy flows out of the natural (kynde) goodness of God for the 
restoration of the fallenness of our sensual nature Julian writes, 
 
And thus this kynde goodnesse makyth that mercy and grace werkyth invs and the kynde goodnesse that we haue of 
hym ablyth vs to receyve the werkyng of mercy and grace (14:57:11-13). 
 
  Instead of using the term image Julian refers to a “kynde goodnesse” in God and a “kynde 
goodnesse” in the soul that comes from God and thus invokes the notion of image.  In the 
doctrine of the imago dei the correspondence between Creator and created in the remaining 
image of God in the fallen soul is as a gift of grace for the purpose of the reception of further 
grace.  This is exactly what is at play in this passage insofar as the kynde goodness that the soul 
has from God enables the soul to receive mercy and grace that will restore the soul.  The 
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correspondence of natural goodness between God and the soul enables the reception of mercy 
and grace.  A further level of profundity in this correspondence lies in the fact that that in which 
the soul is able to receive corresponds with that in God from which he gives.     
 In the same chapter in which Julian refers to the correspondence of kynde goodness in 
the soul with the kynde goodness in God she refers to another type of correspondence which also 
pivots on the kyndes of God and humanity.  Earlier I noted the sense in which faith acts a mirror 
in which the soul is able to see itself.  As it turns out, the very process by which faith is 
engendered in the soul involves a quality of mirroring correspondence: 
 
[Faith] comyth of the hye rychesse of oure kynde substance into oure sensuall soule, and it is groundyd in vs and 
we in that throw the kynde goodnes of god by the werkyng of mercy and grace (14:57:27-30).   
 
One important piece of background for understanding this passage is that Julian in other 
contexts associates kynde with the Father, and mercy with the Son, and grace with the Holy 
Spirit (for an example see the chapter in Julian following the one just quoted:  14:58:32-33).  
The movement of salvation from a divine perspective involves a flowing out from the nature of 
the Father down into the world in the incarnation of mercy and in the ongoing grace-giving 
presence of the Holy Spirit.  When Julian writes that we are grounded in faith through kynde 
goodness, mercy and grace she is referring to the sense in which faith comes to us by virtue of  
the respective contributions of each person of the Trinity in the outworking of our salvation.  
The very possibility for flow in the soul from substance into sensuality is by virtue of the fact 
that these two are knitted together through the incarnation of Jesus (14:57:19-23).  Thus the flow 
of faith from substance into the sensual soul may be said to be both dependent on the 
incarnation of Jesus and correspondent with the flow from the Godhead into creation. 
 The sense in which it may both be said that faith is grounded in us and that we are 
 51
grounded in faith corresponds to the sense in which, in the previous chapter, the soul is said to 
be in God and God in the soul.  Two perspectives on one event are given and each is the 
inverted image of the other.  Faith is grounded in the soul due to the natural rootedness of 
substance in God and the natural flow of this substance downwards into sensuality.  At the same 
time, what is natural to the soul is by virtue of its second making in Christ whose incarnation 
derives from the natural goodness of God.  The fact that faith is ground in us signifies that it is 
not an addition to our nature, something external, but rather natural to us due to our origins.  
Faith belongs to us by virtue of what we are naturally equipped with so that we may be receptive 
to the divine initiative and participate in the outworking of our salvation.  We are grounded in 
faith in a way that corresponds to the sense in which our substance is grounded in God who is 
active in working out our salvation through mercy and grace. 
 Another aspect of correspondence that is related to the goodness of God is found in the 
experience of longing.  In her showings Julian comes to understand that the longing and thirst of 
Christ on the cross has a spiritual aspect which is a longing derived from separation.  Julian 
writes that this longing will last until, “the last soule that shalle be savyd is come vppe to hys 
blysse” (13:31:40).  There is some ambiguity here, possibly intentional, as to whether Jesus is 
longing for reunion or longing for his creatures to enjoy their promised bliss:  in the end the two 
are the same.   
The longing that Jesus feels on the cross comes from his “endlesse goodnes” (13:31:46).  
Goodness here is not kynd, likely because Julian generally reserves the term kynd to the Father 
and to our original creation. By virtue of what Julian calls our first making we have a natural 
likeness to God.  In our again making Jesus becomes our “moder in mercy in oure sensualyte 
takyng” (14:58:44).  In our first making, our likeness to God lies in our substance.  Our second 
making also conveys a quality of likeness, but in this case sensuality too partakes in likeness in 
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some sense.  The likeness that the sensual soul enjoys must pertain to its own nature and this is 
where longing comes in.   
 The emotion of longing pertains to the experience of incompletion which, as earlier 
noted, summarizes the current condition of our sensual nature.  The longing that Jesus feels in 
his chosen kinship with humanity and in his longing for the restoration of humanity is in its 
clearest expression in the longing and thirsting of Christ on the cross.  Julian writes that “of the 
vertu of this longyng in Crist we haue to long agene to hym, without whych no soule comyth to 
hevyn” (13:31:42-43).  Jesus' longing for us is given here as the basis of our longing for him.  
Our sensual nature participates in Christ by longing with Christ for final reunion.  The longing 
that is natural to the sensual soul is given a new basis in our again-making.  The ordinary 
longing of the soul for this and that can thus become a longing for the eternal that originates in 
the longing of the eternal.  Our longing for God is not simply our own without reference, but is 
by virtue of correspondence between the soul and its lord such that the longing of the soul is in 
some sense an image of the longing of Christ.   
 The nature of the correspondence between the longing in Christ and the longing in the 
soul is such that the two are related but not confused.   There is a great deal that is said in this 
regard in the words “we haue to long agene” (13:31:43).  The longing is something that we have 
which suggests that it is ours.  The fact that the longing is agene suggests the sense in which the 
longing is a repetition of the longing in Christ:  the longing is again in us which was first in 
Christ.  In one sense the belonging is entirely ours by nature and is thus not an alien, borrowed, 
super-added state.  Indeed, the longing must entirely belong to us otherwise it would be artificial 
and we would ultimately not be involved in working out our own salvation nor would we be in a 
relationship.  In another sense, the longing that is ours comes to us from Christ as an image or 
echo of Christ's longing.  Christ's longing initiates longing in us.  Part of what is at play here 
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may be the contagiousness of love.  The faithful longing of Christ enables the changeable soul 
to experience a new quality of longing that will ultimately play an integral role in the soul's 
salvation. 
 The correspondence between the divine and the human is most radically suggested in the 
parable of the Servant and the Lord.  The parable  is told twice and interpreted twice.  In one 
interpretation the servant is Adam, who himself represents all humanity, and in the other the 
servant is Jesus.  Julian's intent in making one figure represent two is to express poetically the 
degree of correspondence between the two.  As Julian later explains, “When Adam felle godes 
sonne fell:  for the ryght onyng whych was made in hevyn, goddys sonne myght nott be separath 
from Adam” (14:51:218-220).  The correspondence between humanity and Christ derives from 
a fundamental quality of onying.  The fact that the onying is accomplished in heaven, initially 
suggests the creation of the substance of the soul which, as noted earlier, is knitted to God by 
virtue of its making.  The onying in heaven is bound to imply first the soul's substance, but 
clearly the sensuality of the soul is also intended here for Julian also writes that our sensuality 
was “furst to hym adyght” (14:57:22).  Colledge defines adyght as assigned in his glossary of 
Middle English terms37.  That sensuality was furst assigned to Christ suggests that even before 
the sensual soul was created it was destined for the incarnation.   
 Ultimately Jesus' onying with our nature is in terms of the comprehensive picture of our 
beginning and end.  Julian writes, “And by the endlesse entent and assent and the full acorde of 
all the trynyte, the myd person wolde be grounde and hed of this feyer kynd” (14:53:30-33).  
The endless entent refers to what was foreseen from the beginning in terms of the nature of the 
entire Trinity's involvement in our salvation and in particular that of Christ.  The reference to 
Jesus as the myd person significantly refers to both Jesus' position as second in three in the 
                                                 
37Julian of Norwich, BSAJ, 749. 
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Trinity and also to Jesus as the mediating person between God and humanity38.  Jesus' union 
with our nature is as a reconciler between God and humanity and in the same moment between 
our substance and sensuality.  The endlesse entent encompasses our beginning, middle, and end 
which is to say our substantial making, the union of substance and sensuality  in a state of 
division on earth, and the reunion of substance and sensuality in a state of fulfilled reconciliation 
in heaven.  Jesus is thus our ground and head in terms of the union of substance and sensuality 
and the cohesion of our beginning and end. 
 The union between Jesus and our nature in terms of both substance and sensuality is 
expressed in a correspondence between divine and human happenings.  This correspondence 
goes in both directions.  When Julian writes that when Adam fell, Jesus fell, the correspondence 
is expressed as a correspondence of divine events to human events.  There is a sense in which 
the fall of Christ into Mary's womb is simultaneous in correspondence with the fall of Adam and 
almost takes on the nature of a necessity. 
 Due to the onying between Jesus and the soul, the fall of Adam results in the 
corresponding fall of Jesus.  The direction of correspondence is reversed in the work that is 
begun in the passion of Jesus.  The fulfillment of the soul is in the lifting up of its sensuality into 
its substance.  This is accomplished by the power of Jesus' passion (see (14:56:35-36) though it 
is not to be fulfilled until the end of time.  Jesus lifts up our sensual nature into his in the 
incarnation and by the power of his passion our sensuality is lifted up into the substance of the 
soul.  Julian appeals to the onyng of the soul with Christ and the consequent correspondence 
between the two to make sense of the history of salvation.  The context in which the incarnation 
occurs is understood in terms of correspondence and so is the effectiveness of the incarnation 
and finally the passion.  By virtue of correspondence through onyng, Christ falls with the soul 
                                                 
38See Julian of Norwich, BSAJ, , note 26 on p. 557  
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and the soul is uplifted with Christ. 
 The picture of correspondence that has emerged suggests the existence of two levels of 
reality which are intertwined and yet distinct.  Correspondence respects differences in nature.  
The fall of Adam and Christ are correspondent but the nature of the two falls are essentially 
different.  Likewise, in the correspondence between the divine and the sensual soul, the nature 
of the sensual soul is respected.  Indeed, that which is most natural to the soul, longing, becomes 
the pivotal point of correspondence between Jesus and the soul.  Correspondence doesn't imply 
necessity insofar as it expresses a phenomenon of love and love's onyng.  An appearance of 
necessity may be observed in correspondence and yet there isn't any more necessity in 
correspondence then there is in the harmonization of movements between dance partners. 
 
Mirror Inversion 
 Julian frequently conceives the correspondence between divine and human action in 
terms of inversion.  I have already made reference to the sense in which the alternating 
perspectives of “God in the soul/soul in God”  and “faith grounded in the soul/soul grounded in 
faith” are inverted images of one another.  Correspondence in terms of inversion occurs in more 
direct forms and to explore this I will turn again to the incarnation. 
 In the imago dei tradition the discovery in the soul of a mirror image of God is the 
beginning of the ascent to God.  The process of ascending or returning consists of mirroring the 
image which is in fact Christ.  Julian draws another aspect of the tradition which is in a sense an 
inversion of the one just noted, when she writes that “the fair, bright blessed lord bore the lyknes 
of our fowle blacke dede” (13:37:10).  There is an immediate inversion in the text from fairness 
to foulness and brightness to darkness.  The sense in which this text represents an inversion of 
the aforementioned aspect of the imago dei tradition lies in the notion that the condition of our 
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mirroring of Christ is Jesus' willingness to take on our likeness.  We are able to become like 
God because God has become like us.  It would be problematic to describe Jesus' bearing of our 
likeness as mirroring because this would be to suggest that Jesus only came to resemble 
humanity rather than fully entering humanity.  And yet the bearing of likeness may be seen as 
analogous to mirroring especially in Julian's theology in which the distance between image and 
source is displaced or at least thrown into question.  
 The relationship between our making and our again making, which begins in the 
incarnation, may itself be seen in terms of inversion.  In our first making the soul is knit to God, 
while in our second making God is knit to the soul (14:57:17-19).  In the first making we are 
made out of God while the second making begins with God being made into us.  The second 
making is a mirror inversion of the first making.  The inversion in the process of creation in the 
again making itself effects an inversion in the order of things.  In God's knitting Godself to the 
soul in the incarnation, the high is brought low so that the low may be brought high. 
 The overturning of the order of the world began for Julian in the incarnation when the 
highest was brought low and sensuality was lifted up in the second person of the Trinity.  
However, the inversion of the order of things is ultimately an eschatological event.  Julian looks 
toward this event in her reflections on the inversions between the order of things on earth and 
the order of things in heaven.  The greatest surprise for Julian in terms of inversions in the 
heavenly order is with regard to sin and the suffering it causes:   
 
And God shewed that synne shalle be no shame, but wurshype to man, for right as to every synne is answering a 
payne by truth, right so for every synne to the same soule is gevyn a blysse by loue (13:38:1-3). 
 
Julian doesn’t demonize the order of things on earth for she recognizes here an order of truth 
which seems to follow the law of cause and effect.  It is evident to her that the suffering of 
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humans is the effect of sin.  Part of the reason that she continues to ask how it is that all shall be 
well, as she is shown, is that she expects that the order of truth to continue in the next life in 
terms of the just punishment of human sin.    
The inversion that Julian is surprised with is that not only will we not find in our past sin 
a source of shame, but a source of wurshyp, or of honour as Colledge translates it.39  In the same 
way that every sin on earth corresponds with a particular pain so in heaven will every sin 
correspond with a particular blysse.  The order that prevails in heaven is the order of love.  
Recall here both that in love the soul is onyd to God and that God doesn’t ultimately impute 
blame to the soul for its sin because God always sees the will that never assents to sin in the 
substance of the soul.  In the sensuality of the soul humans choose sin and suffer the 
consequences on earth.  At the same there is a sense in which the sin that was chosen in our 
sensual nature was not consented to in our substance and we nonetheless consequently suffer.  
In the divided state of the soul suffering is inevitable.  When the sensuality of human nature is 
lifted up into the substance of human nature the division is overcome and it is God’s pleasure to 
reward the soul both with the enjoyment of the final victory over sin and with bliss that 
correspond to each sin it did not consent to in it’s substance. 
 A delightful expression of inverse correspondence is found in Julian’s insistence that 
God works “contrary wyse” in his response to human contraryousnes (14:48:40-41).  On an 
eschatological level this means that the pain, blame, and sorrow that our contraryousnes causes 
will, by grace, be transformed into solace, honour, and bliss (14:48:43).  While the contrary 
manner in which God responds to human contraryousnes is only experienced in its fullness in 
heaven, there is nonetheless an earthly experience of God’s contrary working.  Julian discovers 
the contrary working of God in our current experience in the way that God already meets the 
                                                 
39 See Julian of Norwich.  Showings.  Translated by Colledge, E. and Walsh, J.. (New York:  Paulist Press, 1978) 
263. (= C&W, Showings) 
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wrath of our inner division and refusal of love: 
 
For that same endlesse goodnesse that kepyth vs whan we synne that we peryssch nott, that same endlesse 
goodnesse continually tretyth in vs a pees against oure wrath (14:49:24-27). 
 
The goodness of God works contrarily to our contraryousnes by holding us in life when we 
choose that which is contrary to our life and treating our vnpees with pees.  God responds in a 
way that overturns our expectations, we who are more acquainted with the order of cause and 
effect than the order of love.  God’s opposition is true opposition insofar as God meets the 
qualities of our actions with their opposite qualities so that in our sickness we might encounter 
health, and in our inner division we might encounter wholeness. 
Another expression of the inversely related differences in the ways that the two aspects 
of the soul are united to God is found where Julian writes, “For  I saw full suerly that oure 
substance is in god, and also I saw that in oure sensualyte god is” (14:55:23-25). In this we find 
two ways in which God accomplishes our salvation.  The foundation of the work is in the way 
that we are grounded in God in our first making.  The outgrowth of the work is accomplished 
through the indwelling of God.   
 Earlier, I noted that Julian tends to prefer the metaphor of the soul's enclosure in God 
over the metaphor of God's dwelling in  the soul.  Here we see that Julian sees the presence of 
God in the soul and the soul's presence in God as two expressions of grace accomplishing our 
salvation from two different ends.  And yet there is still a sense in which enclosure in God holds 
a special place in Julian's imagination.  Julian describes Jesus' presence in the sensual soul in the 
following: 
That wurshypfull cytte that oure lorde Jhesu syttyth in, it is oure sensualyte, in whych he is enclosyd; and oure 
substance is belclosyd in Jhesu with the blessyd soule of Crist syttyng in rest in the godhead (14:56:23-25). 
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The word enclosure is generally used by Julian to refer to our being in God and so Julian's use 
of this word to describe Jesus' presence in us recalls the sense in which the soul is enclosed in 
God.  Indeed, she refuses to talk about the enclosure of Jesus in the soul without also referring to 
the sense in which the substance of the soul is enclosed in Jesus:  Jesus is at rest in the sensuality 
of the soul while the substance of the soul is at rest in Jesus.  There is a quality of 
correspondence in the mutuality of enclosure and resting.  The resting of the substance of the 
soul in Jesus connotes the security and safety of the soul in the Godhead.  The resting of Jesus in 
the soul suggests that he is at home and thus the ultimate security and salvation of the soul is 
safeguarded.  Further, the resting of Jesus in the soul, in whom substance rests, promises the 
fulfillment of the reconciliation of substance and sensuality. 
 The manner in which Jesus accomplishes our salvation on earth through our sensual soul 
is an inversion of the manner in which God accomplishes our salvation in heaven.  And yet the 
inversion appears in some sense to be in the process of being inverted!  When Julian refers to 
the presence of Jesus in the soul she writes that it is the pleasure of Christ to “sytt(e) in oure 
soule restfully, and to dwell in oure soule endlesly, vs all werkyng in to hym” (14:57:55,56).  
The very activity of Christ in the soul involves a process of incorporating the soul into him.  On 
another occasion, Julian writes that the substance of the soul is completely present in each 
person of the Trinity, while the sensual soul is only in Jesus (14:58:62-63).  Incidentally, this 
passage clarifies some of the confusion concerning how it is that Julian refers on one occasion to 
substance being in the Father and on another in Jesus.  Of more immediate interest is the fact 
that Julian here has referred to the sensual as being in Jesus.  Through the incarnation into the 
sensual nature of the soul, the sensual nature of the soul is lifted up into Christ even as much as 
he may be said to be in the sensual soul.  Perhaps Julian does not want us to rest in one image or 




In her introduction Julian presents her showings as God’s response to her prayer for 
bodily sickness and intimate and experiential recollection of the passion of Jesus.  Julian’s 
visions of the passion lie at the center of her showings and her ensuing reflections radiate from 
these visions.  Indeed the visions of the passion are the vivid and bodily perceived sources of the 
theological abstractions that comprise Julian’s reflections.40  In turning now to the visions of the 
passion I would like to briefly take note of how they represent the foregoing and then explore 
the implications that emerge from these visions in relation to the themes of mirroring and 
inversion. 
The double vision is especially vividly represented in the visions of the passion and with 
a quality of immediacy and simultaneity that is only possible in the visual.  This doubleness is 
expressed in a vision in which Jesus’ head is copiously bleeding:   
 
the bledyng continued tylle many thnges were sene and vnderstondyd.  Nevertheles the feyerhede and lyuelyhede 
continued in the same bewty and lyuelynes  (1:7:19-21). 
 
The simultaneity of an impression of liveliness and beauty with a perception of the dying and 
bleeding of Christ is especially striking in this passage.  Julian’s more abstract and prosaic 
reflections constantly refer to doubleness, but often, due to the very nature of narrative, the 
simultaneity is lost and a sense of chronology, what is now and what will be then, prevails.  
However, in the evocation of the vision, the sense in which two may exist simultaneously is 
more powerfully preserved. 
                                                 
40 I want to be cautious of making too fine of a distinction between the visual showings and the more abstract 
reflections.  Julian refers to the former as bodily and the latter as gostely or spiritual but both may be referred to 
as showings. 
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 In some sense the visions of the passion are given as a mirror in which we are able to see 
ourselves and our experience in greater relief than is generally afforded in our narrow and 
constrained fallen state.  Insofar as Jesus enters our sensual nature and lifts it up into his nature 
for our salvation, we may both see in the passion something of who we now are and something 
of what we are in the process of becoming.  When Julian further comments on the vision of 
Jesus’ bleeding head she writes, 
 
Thys shewyng was quyk and lyuely and hidows and dredfulle and swete and louely; and of all the syght that I saw 
this was most comfort to me, that oure good lorde, that is so reverent and dredefulle, is so homely and so curteyse, 
and this most fulfyllyd me with lykyng and sykernes in soule (1:7:30-34). 
 
The hideousness in the vision is due to Jesus’ suffering of our sensual nature.  The passion 
consists in the entry into the extremities of the human condition:  in Julian’s vision where we 
feel pain, Jesus experiences pain beyond endurance.  The sweetness lies in Jesus’ awareness that 
the salvation of humanity is being accomplished through his suffering.  The simultaneity of 
hidows and dredfulle with swete and louely also reflects the current division of sensuality and 
substance and the consequent duality of human experience.  The perception of this experience in 
Jesus links it to the manner in which Jesus is at the same time reconciling sensuality and 
substance.  Our current experience is thus linked to our fulfillment and it is possible to begin to 
see our pain in light of its blossoming transformation in the bliss of reconciliation. 
 The other aspect of this vision lies in the double vision of Jesus as the one whom we 
reverently fear and yet also as one who is entirely familiar41 and courteous with us.  In this the 
double sense of our relationship to God is reflected.  God is infinitely distant and other and at 
the same time God is altogether close and intimate.  The transcendence of God is here held 
                                                 
41 Colledge translated homely as familiar.  See his translation Julian of Norwich, Showings, 188. 
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together with God’s immanence.   
In some sense the hideousness of the vision and the dreadfulness of God are to be held 
together inasmuch as the dreadfulness of God relates to the experience of his immensity in 
immutability and eternity from the perspective of our littleness in mutability and mortality due 
to our sensual nature.  The sweetness of the vision relates to God’s familiarity by virtue of the 
reconciliation in which we experience the closeness and even kinship of God.  Jesus becomes 
close and familiar to Julian in his suffering and this proximity is thus a matter of joy and pain.  
Julian’s resulting feeling of security and delight is a foretaste in time of the eternal perspective 
and experience in which all is well. Julian’s experience now of a sense of delight and security 
surely relates to the quality of simultaneity in the vision.  The fulfillment of reconciliation 
between substance and sensuality and God and soul is certainly yet to come; however, the 
simultaneity of the vision suggests a sense in which the fulfillment in eternity is concurrent with 
the temporal experience of the pain of division.   
 
Meekness and Noughting 
 A number of minor visions occur as satellites to the major visions of the passion.  Julian 
refers to these minor visions as occurring at the same time as the visions of the passion and she 
indicates that they serve as commentaries on the passion visions, clarifying some aspect or 
other.  The vision of Mary and the hazelnut vision are two important satellite visions and each 
further flesh out a learning that is evidently not to be lost on the reader.  The first concerns 
meekness and the second concerns what Julian refers to as noughting.   
 In the vision of Mary, Julian is given a model for how contemplation of God is to affect 
the contemplative.  When Mary beholds God in God's greatness she is filled with reverent fear.  
In light of this vision she sees her own smallness and is thus filled with meekness.  Out of the 
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ground of Mary's meekness she is filled with such grace that she surpasses all creatures (1:7:1-
11).  The obvious inversion here is that as Mary recognizes her smallness she is made great.   
 The sense in which the vision of Mary's meekness is related to the vision of the passion 
lies in Julian's identification of the picture of the highest becoming lowest as the most important 
aspect of the passion to be contemplated (8:20:10-12).  This picture indicates the depths of 
God's love for humanity, but it also serves as a type of image to be imitated.  In Julian's vision 
of how the failure of sin is by God's grace turned to profit, the becoming low that is meekness 
plays a central role.  In language that echoes scenes of the passion Julian writes,  
 
Synne is the sharpest scorge that ony chosyn soule may be smyttyn with, whych scorge all to betyth man or woman, 
and alle to brekyth hym, and purgyth hym in hys own syght (13:39:1-3).   
 
In the painful awareness of sin illusions about who we are are purged and we are broken down.  
The consummation of this purging involves deeply learning how small or low we are, which 
learning Julian identifies as meekness.  Later Julian writes that through meekness “we shall be 
reysyd in hevyn, to whych rysyng we myght nevyr haue comyn without that mekness” 
(14:61:30,31).  Here we see why it is that the chosyn soule is whipped by sin.  The fall into sin 
serves as an opportunity to realize our lowness in meekness.  The intimacy with our lowness, 
which is itself a gift of mercy, is given as the condition or ground of being raised into heights of 
heaven that we would not have known if we had not fallen.  
 The manner in which meekness is the foundation for rising high is of course another 
example of the inversions that Julian is so fond of.  God's enclosure is also at play here for both 
the falling and the rising are held in the mercy of God.  By God's mercy we are able to see our 
fallenness and learn meekness, and by God's mercy we are raised to new heights.  The 
correspondence of falling low to rising high is by virtue of God's mercy. 
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 Another aspect of correspondence that may be found in the inversion of low into high is 
discovered in recalling that the lesson of meekness is given in relation to the passion.  Julian 
gives three ways of contemplating the passion.  In the first the pain that Christ suffers recalls the 
consequences of our sin.  In the second we see in the suffering of Jesus the heights of his love.  
In the third way we are given bliss as we behold and share God's delight in our salvation.  The 
contemplation of the passion thus involves a movement from beholding the correspondence of 
the pain of our sinning, both in ourselves and in Jesus' passion, to beholding the extent of God's 
love, to enjoying God's bliss.  The contemplation of the passion itself correspondingly follows 
the arc of meekness from the depths into the heights.  Depths and heights thus are not opposites 
but related and corresponding moments or events in the outworking of mercy. 
 While meekness involves the recognition of the littleness of ourselves, noughting 
follows the recognition of the littleness of all things made relative to their Creator.  The vision 
of the little thing the size of a hazelnut in Julian’s hand is another satellite vision that occurs at 
the same time as the first revelation and is a further commentary on God's familiar loving.  In 
this vision the appearance of the smallness of creation inspires Julian concerning the cause of 
our restlessness.  She writes, 
 
Of this nedyth vs to haue knowledge, that vs lyketh nought all thing that is made, for to loue and haue god that is 
vnmade.  For this is the cause why we be not all in ease of hart and of sowle, for we seeke heer rest in this thing that 
is so little, wher no reste is in, and we know not our god, that is almightie, all wise and all good, for he is verie reste 
(1:5:24-29). 
  
Julian perceives that creation is too small for us to find our rest in and that we must turn to the 
Creator to find our rest.  When she writes that we should lyketh not all things made, the first 
sense is that we should not delight in things made.  Lyking, as noted, is another word whose 
 65
polysemeity Julian tends to exploit.  Lyketh here signifies enjoy or delight but also brings to 
mind the themes of becoming like in friendship and love.  Liking in this sense relates to the 
theme that proliferates in the imago dei tradition that one becomes like what one likes.  The 
withdrawal of attachment to things made relates to a concern to become like God who is vnmade 
rather than things that are made.   
 The turning to the Creator consists in what Julian later describes as becoming “noughted 
of all thinges that is made” (1:5:31).  Julian plays with the word nought in this passage to 
express that noughting involves liking nought creation, which is on the verge of falling into 
nought, so that we may be noughted of all things.  The purpose of being noughted is “to haue 
him that is all” (1:5:32).  Terms of negation reverberate through the passage prefacing the 
wonder of having him that is all.  The paradox is thus stressed that in order to have the one who 
is all, we must let go of all.     
 The movement towards “him that is all” is elsewhere expressed as a movement from the 
world into the soul and from the soul into God (16:68:30).  This movement expresses the 
process of being noughted.   The inversion at play is obvious.  As one moves inward away from 
created things one moves towards the one in whom all created things are held, as the “hazelnut” 
vision shows.  It must be noted that Julian is not here promulgating a negative estimation of 
creation, for she has already stated that all creation is held in God's love and she ultimately sees 
nothing bad in what is created.  The very nature of the inversion at play displaces direction such 
that moving away is also moving towards.  However, if a direction is to be insisted upon, it is 
towards loving all things in God and detaching from things in themselves.   
Kerrie Hide writes that for Julian beholding the passion reveals how Christ draws us into 
union with him.42 The two satellite visions that introduce the themes of meekness and being 
                                                 
42Hide, GO, 114. 
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noughted indicate not only how we are drawn, but the active role that we are to take in 
participating in the process of onyng that is at play in Jesus' passion.  It is highly fitting that 
meekness and being noughted are elucidated at the same time as visions of the passion inasmuch 
as each involves a type of participation in the passion.  The road to meekness involves being 
scourged by sin, humbly submitting to suffering, and being brought low.  Being noughted in a 
sense continues this process insofar as its negation involves a type of dying.  Finally, both 




















The Imago Trinitatis and the  
Enclosed Progression of the Soul 
 
 Julian's soteriology is fundamentally trinitarian.  Consequently, any discussion of the 
role of the doctrine of the imago dei in Julian's economy of salvation would be incomplete 
without reference to the imago trinitatis and the way that the entire Trinity is thus active in the 
outworking of salvation.  The distinction between the imago trinitatis and the nature in which 
the Trinity itself is at work in the life of the soul is very fine indeed.  The reason the distinction 
can be difficult at times to make involves my early observations on Julian’s use of metaphors of 
enclosure.  The soul is enclosed in the Trinity and the Trinity is enclosed in the soul.  Kerrie 
Hide comments that this “mutual enclosure elucidates the indissolubility of the unity between 
human beings and the Trinity.”  The soul participates in the life and work of the Trinity, the 
Trinity is the ground of all that the soul does in realizing its destiny, and the soul bears the 
image of the Trinity.  This knot is difficult to entangle and indeed this is to the good of our 
salvation.   
 Julian appeals to church teaching to make the point that we are made in the likeness of 
the Trinity.  She incorporates this teaching into the contemplation of her own showings when 
she specifies that it is in our first making, the making of our substance, that we are made in the 
image of the Trinity (2:10:53,54).  Later she writes that in the substance of our soul we are 
wholly in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit (14:58:62).  As noble as this beginning may 
be, it is not sufficient for we are made double.  Again making is necessary for the fulfillment of 
the soul in its entirety.  With regard to this again making Julian writes: 
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And right as we were made lyke to trynyte in oure furst making, our maker would that we should be lyke to Jhesu 
Cryst oure sauiour in hevyn without ende by the vertu of oure (geyn) makyng (2:10:53-56). 
 
This passage begins to qualify the meaning of being made in the image of the Trinity.  In our 
substance we are made in the image of the Trinity, as our beginning and ground.  Our making in 
the Trinity is in the past tense, we were made.  By contrast, the words  would that we should are 
oriented to the future.  Would signifies that it is God’s will and should implies command, 
responsibility and even a quality of necessity in what is yet to be fulfilled.43 Becoming like 
Christ should happen inasmuch as it is our destiny by God’s unfailing will, and we should 
become like and begin to pattern our lives after Christ insofar as this is how God has ordained us 
to live.  To summarize, we are made in the image of the Trinity in our substance, and we are in 
the process of being conformed to the likeness of Christ in the restoration of our sensual nature 
to our substance.  The imago trinitatis may thus be seen as the ground and beginning of our 
salvation and the imago dei genita, or Christ, the end. 
 The language here can give the sense that the imago trinitatis has been superseded, but 
of course that is not at all the case.  When Julian writes that while our substance is in the three 
persons and sensual nature is only in Jesus she is sure to add, “in whom is the fader and the holy 
gost” (14:58:64).  Our beginnings are in the life of the Trinity and in our deepest nature we 
enjoy a certain union with the Trinity, but the fulfillment of this union in the lifting up of our 
sensual nature into substance is through Jesus and in becoming like Jesus.  We move into the 
life of the Trinity through Jesus. 
 The shape of our final salvation is given in Christ;  however, the entire Trinity is 
involved in the accomplishment of this salvation.  In a chapter devoted specifically to the Trinity 
                                                 
43 See Hide’s discussion of the ME sense of shall as signifying necessity:  Hide, GO, 159. 
 69
Julian concludes a paragraph in which she has outlined three properties of the working of the 
Trinity writing: 
 
For alle oure lyfe is in thre:  in the furst (we haue) oure beyng, and in the seconde we haue oure encresyng, and in 
the thyrde we haue oure fulfyllyng.  The furst is kynde, the seconde is mercy, the thyrde is grace (14:58:30-33).   
 
In concluding that “alle oure lyfe is in thre,” Julian implies that our life is inseparable from the 
working of the Trinity.  In the keeping of our kyndely substance in the Father we have our being; 
in the keeping of our sensuality in the Son we have our increasing; and in the rewarding of the 
Holy Spirit we have our fulfilling.  The particular working of each person of the Trinity together 
thus marks the span of our lives giving it shape and direction.   
 After briefly identifying the sense in which our life is in three, Julian identifies these 
three aspects of our lives in terms of three more descriptives of the properties of the working of 
the three persons of the Trinity:  kynde, mercy, and grace respectively.  Julian thus intertwines a 
description of the predestined life course of the chosen between two descriptions of the working 
of the three persons of the Trinity.  The metaphor of knitting is a favourite of Julian's and here, 
in the very structure of the text, she gives a rhetorical example of such knitting and in this gives 
another sense of the intimacy of our life with the working of the Trinity.  
 Julian's writing on the manner in which we are made in the imago trinitatis is essentially 
in accord with Augustine's own view on the matter.44  Julian clearly draws on Augustine's 
notion of an analogy and even participatory link45 between the Trinity and the intellectual 
faculties of mind or memory, reason, and will.  Julian does however use slightly different 
language which may itself serve as commentary on Augustine's own terms.  In place of 
                                                 
44See Nuth, WD, 104-112. 
45Bell, IL 104. 
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intellectus Julian refers to wisdom, which is of course no major departure.  Julian consistently 
refers to love as the property of the Spirit.  In place of memoria, which refers to the Father, 
Julian uses the terms might (14:58:34) and truth (14:44:12).  Bell describes memoria as what 
God uses to call the soul back46 and as the soul's ultimate incapacity to forget its origins47.  
Julian's reference to the Father in terms of might should be seen also in light of her identification 
of the property of the working of the father in terms of kynd or nature.  The might of the Father 
may thus be associated with a remaining fundamental power in human beings that is the basis 
for return to God.  The use of the word truth in place of memoria is more obviously related to 
the sense in memoria of a truth remembered, that is, once again, the basis for the spiritual 
journey of return.   
 In terms of the manner in which each aspect of the imago trinitatis may be seen as 
oriented to our final destiny, Julian writes that being made with the same properties as God the 
soul, “evyr more it doyth that it was made for:  it seeth god, and it beholdyth god and it louyth 
god” (14:44:14).  Being made in the image of the Trinity is ultimately oriented to the full 
enjoyment of God.  Further on in the same passage Julian also writes of the soul:  “the bryghtnes 
and clerness of truth and wysedome makyth him to see and know that he is made for loue” 
(14:44:19-21).  The love that is the blossom of the Son and the Father, likewise blooms out of 
truth and wisdom in humanity.  There is a playful ambiguity in terms of whether the love in 
which the soul is kept is the soul's own love or the love of God or the Holy Spirit.   
 For Julian there is a sense in which we were created double precisely so that the entire 
Trinity might be involved in our destiny.  In concluding a chapter on the Trinity she writes, 
 
For only by oure reson we may nott profyte, but yf we haue evynly therwith mynde and loue, ne onely in oure 
                                                 
46Bell, IL, 97. 
47Bell, IL,102. 
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kyndly grounde that we haue in god, we may not be savyd, but yf we haue, co(m)yng of the same grounde, mercy 
and grace.  For of these thre werkynges alle to geder we receyue all oure goodys, of whych the furst be goodys of 
kynde.  For in oure furst makyng god gaue vs moch good and a grete good as we myght receyve onely in oure 
spyryte; but his forseeyng perpos in his endlesse wysdom wolde that we were doubyll (14:56:51-59). 
 
Due to being made double, the mercy of the Son and the grace of the Spirit must compliment 
and indeed complete what is begun in the kyndly ground of the Father.  Further, the necessity for 
the involvement of the entire Trinity corresponds with the necessity for the mutual involvement 
of each of our faculties of reason, memory, and love.  One is not sufficient without the other.  
The entirety and fullness of our good and salvation involves both the work of the entire Trinity 
and each of the properties in which we are made in the imago trinitatis. 
 
Enclosed Progression 
 The intertwining of the working of the Trinity with the life of the soul gives a particular 
shape both to human intellectual faculties and to the course of human destiny.  In the manner in 
which Julian conceives the shape of human destiny the motif of exitus/reditus may clearly be 
read48.  The notion of  exitus/reditus comes to mystical theology through Plotinus.  In brief, 
Plotinus conceives of a cyclical phenomenon of emanation from the One and return thereto.  
Emanation consists in a process of increasing distinct concreteness in terms of a movement from 
the One to intelligence (nous) to the Soul to embodiment in matter49.  Echoes of this process of 
emanation may be observed in the narrative of creation that Julian gradually develops through 
her text.   The creation of the substance of the soul out of God is not unlike the emergence of 
nous and the soul's embodiment in sensuality and the consequences of this bears parallels to the 
                                                 
48 Hide, GO, 57-60. 
49 Andrew Louth,.  The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition:  From Plato to Denys.  (Oxford:  Clarendon 
Press, 1981) 39. 
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emanation of matter.   But, important differences remain and these will emerge as I explore how 
the motif of exitus/reditus is introduced through Julian's trinitarian soteriology.  I should note 
here that Julian doesn't seem to have ever read Plotinus and does not use the terms he uses; 
however, the motif of the exitus/reditus achieved wide circulation in Christian theology and 
Julian has clearly appears made extensive use of it50.  
According to Julian, in the very moment of the soul's embodiment the process of return 
to God is in motion.  This may be seen in Julian’s conception of the source of faith in the soul: 
 
Oure feyth comyth of the kynde loue of oure soule, and of the clere lyghte of oure reson, and of the 
stedfaste mynde which we haue of god in oure furst mayking.  And what tyme oure soule is enspyred in oure body, 
in which we be made sensuall, as soone mercy and grace begynne to werke, having of vs cure and kepyng with 
pytte and loue, in which werkyng the holy gost formyth in oure feyth hope that we shall come agayne vp abovyn to 
our substannce, in to the vertu of Crist, encresyd and fulfyllyd throw the holy gost  (14:55:14-21). 
 
The fall occurs in the context of circularity both in the sense of a beginning that doesn't entirely 
end and in the sense of a promise of return.  The substance's enclosure in the kynd of God 
signifies the continuity of God's will, as well as of a godly will, in humanity and this constitutes 
the beginning of the promise of return.  The capacity to grasp this promise is given by virtue of 
being made in the image of the Trinity:  our kynde love, clear reason and steadfast memory.  At 
the very moment in which we become sensual, the Son and the Spirit are immediately at work in 
beginning to restore the sensuality of the soul to the substance of the soul and inasmuch as we 
experience this work hope is added to faith.  Through being made in the imago trinitatis in the 
substance of our soul we are given the capacity to form faith and thus have the basis for our 
return.  Our sensual nature is the realm of experience and when our experience is shaped by 
                                                 
50 Hide, GO, 57. 
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faith we are enabled to see and experience the workings of mercy and grace and are given 
ground for hope in what is to come. 
Julian's metaphor of enclosure implies the circularity of the motif of exitus/reditus.  The 
soul is always in some sense held in God.  I have alluded to many of the metaphors by which 
Julian expresses this revelation to her.  One further image of enclosure that I have not touched 
upon is found in the structuring of time in salvation history.  Julian is given a glimpse into this 
structure in these comforting words from “oure goode lorde:” 
 
I may make alle thyng welle, and I can make alle thyng welle, and I shalle make alle thyng welle and I wylle make 
alle thyng welle; and thou shalt se thyselfe that alle maner of thyng shall be welle (13:31:2-6). 
 
In “I may make alle thyng welle” Julian perceives the working of the Father.  The word may 
thus refers to God’s might and capacity to make all things well.  This might is the abiding 
ground of our salvation and includes the manner in which the substance of our soul remains in 
the Father.  Insofar as may refers to the ground, foundation and origin of both our souls and our 
salvation it refers to our deep past, which in some sense abides.  “I can make alle thyng welle” 
pertains to the work of Christ in which we are made again, and enabled in our movement of 
return.  “I can” refers to the present time.  Julian understands, “I wylle make all thyng welle,” in 
terms of the Holy Spirit’s involvement in the eschatological fulfillment of our salvation, thus 
referring to the future.  The span of our time lies between our origins in God and the fulfillment 
of our return to God by the working of the Holy Spirit.  Even the time in between is conceived 
in terms of the enabling presence of Christ.  Finally, “I shalle make alle thyng welle”  refers to 
the work of the Trinity.  Hide recognizes a quality of necessity in shalle in its Middle English 
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usage51.   As a whole the Trinity constitutes the entire span of time giving a shape to time that 
becomes its very nature and necessity.  Ultimately time is bound to one beginning, progression 
and end insofar as its shape is conveyed by the working of three persons in one.  In this picture 
of time, the soul is enclosed in the love of God by virtue of the nature of its past, present and 
future.   
 The process of return as it is conceived by Plotinus and other neo-platonists is a solitary 
journey without aid even from the One, and is progressively spiritual until every trace of matter 
and distinction drops away.  In Christian adaptations of the notion of exitus/reditus the notion of 
the solitary nature of the return is decisively dropped as one may readily see in Julian’s 
perception of an absolute saturation of presence and help.  The spiritual nature of the return with 
an according hatred of matter has presented more of a temptation to mystics.  Julian is not be 
counted among those who were caught in this snare. 
 If the Father and the Spirit constitute the enclosure of our destiny, the Son, as the mid-
person meets us at the midpoint entering into sensual nature and thus into time and the realm of 
experience.  The entry of the divine one into the midpoint, between the exitus and the reditus 
transforms the neo-platonist cosmology giving sensuality a new and lasting dignity.  Our sensual 
nature is never transcended, but is transformed in being lifted up into substance by virtue of the 
incarnation and passion of Jesus.  Further, as much as sensual nature constitutes the occasion of 
the fall and its attendant suffering, it is clearly considered a fortunate fall and equally the 
occasion for gain.  Indeed the work of Jesus consists in encresyng.  The increase that occurs 
through the fall and its restoration in Christ is conceived in the sense of the heights being better 
known through acquaintance with the depths.  As the soul comes to know its littleness, the 
immensity of God’s love is better known.  One might even say that the extent of the love of God 
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is better known by having fought against it. 
Implicit even in the above conceptions of the nature of increase is the priority of the 
notion of onyng.  The knowledge of love is inseparable from the experience of love and love 
itself realizes onyng.  The work of each person of the Trinity can, or rather should be conceived 
in terms of onyng.  We are created as one in the Father, increased in oneness in the Son in this 
lifetime, and fulfilled in oneness in the Spirit in heaven52.  The sense in which Jesus ultimately 
increases oneness is by lifting up sensuality into substance.  The goodness that was only enjoyed 
spiritually will hence, by the fulfilling work of the Holy Spirit, also be enjoyed in our sensual 
nature.  The material is thus reconciled with the spiritual.  Oneness is increased by including the 
very sensuality that gave occasion for the fall into division.   
The notion of increase or progress in terms of something that is gained as a result of 
emanation is lost to the neo-platonic tradition and indeed to aspects of the Christian tradition.  
Not so for Julian.  Between the enclosure of the Father and the Spirit a quality of progression 
and development is accomplished through the Son.  However, the Father and the Spirit cannot 
be excluded from this quality for in the Trinity where one works there work all.  Most 
obviously, the Spirit’s involvement may be observed in terms of the fulfillment of what is begun 
in Christ.  The sense in which the Father is involved is less immediately apparent.  The 
properties of the Son and the Spirit emerge from that of the Father, who is primarily associated 
with kynd as in nature, and thus the progression initiated by the Son and fulfilled by the Spirit 
must be seen as begun in the Father.  In one sense then the picture here is of enclosed 
progression, but only if the loving manner of God’s enclosure may be seen at play in the 
progression of oneness. 
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Chapter 4 
The Salvation of All 
 
 Readers of Julian of Norwich's Showings have frequently concluded a doctrine of 
universalism from her adage that all shall be well.  While a good deal of the foregoing may be 
viewed as laying the ground for the argument that Julian is a universalist, I have to concede to 
Grace Jantzen's observation that while one may find a hope for the salvation of every soul in 
Julian's text, one does not find a doctrine of universalism53.  In these final pages, I will briefly 
explore Julian's most direct comments about hell and damnation.  Julian's references to 
damnation and her sincere loyalty to Church teaching make strident claims that she is a 
universalist dubious.  However, a radical hope for the salvation of all may nonetheless be 
discerned.  I will conclude this paper with some final remarks on the nature of Julian's hope. 
 Before continuing I should note that Julian’s world was Christendom and not the 
pluralistic context which defines contemporary considerations of soteriology.  However, Julian 
was certainly aware of Jews and while she recognizes the Church’s teaching that Jews are 
damned, she also notes that in her visions she didn’t see anything regarding the damnation of the 
Jews (13:33:21-23)54.  The tension here relates to the tension that pervades Julian’s entire text 
and that is the tension between Julian’s faithfulness to Church teaching and her faithfulness to 
her own vision.  The resolution of this tension is ultimately left to Julian’s expectation of an 
unknown marvel in which she places great hope.  I will return to a consideration of this 
unknown marvel.  For the time being, suffice it to say that it is reasonable to conclude that 
Julian includes the fate of the Jews in the scope of her general hope. 
                                                 
53Grace Jantzen, Julian of Norwich:  Mystic and Theologian.  (Great Britain:  Paulist Press, 1987) 179. 
54 See Nuth, WD, 164-165.  
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 Julian may also have been dimly aware of the existence of Muslims, but she certainly 
would not have been aware of Buddhists, Hindus or other eastern religious traditions.  These 
were not within Julian’s radar as she pondered the question of the salvation of all.  
Consequently, one must be very cautious and perhaps tentative in the application of Julian’s 
conclusions to contemporary questions of soteriology.  At the same time, Julian reflects on the 
nature of the human soul, not simply the Christian soul, and so it is reasonable to extend her 
hope beyond the limits of the world that she happened to be aware of.  One must of course be 
aware that such an extension  constitutes a modern application of Julian’s thought and one that 
would not have been in her purview. 
 
The Threat of Damnation 
 As much as Julian's showings may be characterized as revelations of divine love, it is 
impossible to read her text in its entirety without noting her preoccupation with the question of 
damnation.  One might say that the very focus on divine love in her showings fuels Julian's 
preoccupation.  Up until the showing of the Lord and the Servant, Chapter 51, Julian is 
continuously asking how her showing that all shall be well may be reconciled with the Church's 
teaching regarding the damnation of unrepentant souls.  Julian repeatedly confirms her 
faithfulness to Church teaching and her prayer is simply that she might be given understanding 
that would resolve the tension between Church teaching and her showings.  After the vision of 
the Lord and Servant the prayers for enlightenment on the tension cease due in part to new 
insight concerning the enduring nature of the godly will in the saved.  In fact, her fears are only 
somewhat eased and the desire behind her prayer is only partly answered (14:53:9-10).  The 
threat of damnation remains and Julian seems to resign herself to the mystery of how then all 
can be well. 
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 In considering Julian's thought on the threat of damnation one must recall that Julian was 
an anchoress and anchoritic spirituality, as evidenced in the Ancrene Wisse, alternated between 
bridal mysticism and a fear of damnation that borders on extreme.  The very flight to the 
containment of the anchoress' cell may in part be understood in the context of a conception of 
the world as a space in which the devil roams as a hunting and devouring lion55.  Though 
Julian's text is certainly not without allusions to the prowling of the devil, it must be said that 
relative to the tone of the Ancrene Wisse the sense of threat in Julian's showings is 
overshadowed by her hope and her confidence in God's love.   
 When the devil does appear to Julian it is in a dream in which he approaches and tries to 
choke Julian to death but cannot.  When Julian awakes she experiences the remnants of the 
devil's presence in a sensation of heat and the scent of a terrible stench.  Julian wonders if she 
and the others in the room are about to be burned to death (14:67:16-19).  Several things stand 
out in this experience.  The first is that Julian is clearly disturbed by the dream.  She wakes in a 
sweat with her heart pounding and feeling more dead than alive.  The second is that in spite of 
her fear throughout the dream she declares that her trust in God's keeping never failed.  The 
simultaneity of the sense of fear and the quality of trust and confidence recalls the duality or 
doubleness of the current human condition.  For Julian in this experience the reality of danger 
and threat exists alongside a confidence that all shall be well. 
 Another thing that stands out about the dream of the devil is the very fact that it was a 
dream.  Julian notes that while the rest of her showings occur in a waking state this showing of 
the devil occurred while she was asleep.  Julian doesn't comment on this contrast except to make 
the contrast itself explicit.  One is drawn to wonder whether there is any significance in the fact 
                                                 
55Anchoritic Spirituality:  Ancrene Wisse and Associated Works.  Translated by Savage, A., and Watson, N..  (New 
York:  Paulist Press, 1991) 182.  For the original English text see, The English Text of the Ancrene 
Riwle:  Ancrene Wisse:  Edited from MS Corpus Christi College Cambridge 402, Edited by 
J.R.R. Tolkein.  EETS os 249 (Oxford, 1962). 
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that for Julian the vision of an encounter of evil is of another quality and type than the visions of 
God's saving work. 
 Julian's showings are clear and specific when elucidating the nature and intent of the 
consequences of sin in the present time; however, when the question turns to eternal 
consequences Julian becomes vague, uncertain and often hesitant.  The appearance of the devil 
only in dream states may be recalled here alongside the curious fact that Julian's prayer for a 
vision of hell and purgatory is never granted.  This absence is in marked contrast to the visions 
of many of her contemporaries who at times seem to have visions of nothing but purgatory and 
hell.  Julian's clearest vision concerning damnation is found in the fifth revelation concerning 
the eternal damnation of the devil.  The eternal suffering of the devil consists of the suffering 
that the devil intended for those that were finally saved.  The suffering that the devil did cause 
for the saved is turned to joy and this same suffering is left with the devil in his eternal 
damnation (5:13:46-48).  Interestingly, Julian's only vision of the sufferings of damnation 
directly pertains only to the devil and relates back to the eternal joy of the saved. 
 Later, when Julian does not receive a vision of purgatory or hell, she comes to 
understand from the vision of the devil's damnation that “alle the creatures that be of the 
devylles condiscion in thys lyfe and ther in endyng, ther no more mencyon made of them before 
god and alle his holyn then of the devylle” (13:33:11-14).  Julian here recognizes the possibility 
that even the baptized could succumb to such a fate.  It is noteworthy that Julian doesn't  remark 
on the nature of the experience of the damnation of human beings and even seems loath to refer 
to it as damnation.  Instead, she alludes to a sense in which the unsaved are forgotten.  Again, 
the locus of attention is the heavenly host with the experience of the damned understood only 
with regard to the experience of the saved.  Here the experience of the saved in relation to the 
damned is not joy, as it was with regard to the devil, but almost a non-experience – a not-
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mentioning.    
 In the Short Text of Julian's showings, written not long after the visions first occurred, 
Julian reflects more on the specific nature of sin and the consequent nature of damnation.  Julian 
concludes there that sin is nothing and that those who love sin will end up as nothing56.  This 
line of thinking is consistent with Julian's discussion in the Long Text of wrath as a direct 
consequence of the individual's rebellion against his own deepest nature.  Notably, Julian omits 
her earlier reflections on the specific nature of damnation in the more evolved Long Text.  The 
movement from describing damnation in terms of non-existence to damnation in terms of not 
being mentioned before God seems to mark an increasing hesitancy on Julian's behalf to make 
definite conclusions concerning the nature of damnation without wishing to dismiss the 
possibility of damnation. 
 Julian's comments on the soul's disappearance into nothingness in the Short Text and in 
the Long Text of not being mentioned before God both relate to a quality of absence from God.  
As much as Julian's thought here becomes vague and hesitating there is simultaneously a sense 
in which she reaches into her profoundest observations on the nature of sin and damnation.  
Ultimately Julian urges that it is not hell that is to be feared but hell's sin.  The pains of hell 
mean nothing apart from the horror of sin (16:76:5-8).  Julian clarifies the precise nature of the 
evilness and even pain of sin when she writes that there is nothing more painful for the soul than 
to have turned away from God (16:76:11).  Those of the devil's condition, who participate in 
hell's sin, are finally those who have turned away from God.  Building on Julian's thought on the 
nature of the substance of the soul as a participation in God, it is possible to conclude that the 
horror of damnation is nothing less than the horror of having turned away from the loving 
source and core of one's own being. 
                                                 




 While Julian may wonder how her showings and Church teaching harmonize on a 
theological level, she is clear about their complementarity on a pastoral level.  Indeed Julian is 
confident that all that is “speedfulle” for us to know is in the teaching of the Church (13:34:13).  
All that is useful, all that speeds the soul on its way is in Church teaching.  One may discern an 
analogy in Julian's approach to Origen's own thought on the matter as when he writes that the 
Logos “wisely utters threatening words with a hidden meaning to frighten people who would not 
otherwise be able to turn away from the flood of their sins.”57  While Julian may not go as far in 
her speculations as Origen does concerning the exclusively didactic nature of the teaching on 
damnation, she is certainly far more enthusiastic and confident in writing about the purpose of 
this teaching than she is concerning its specific content.  The purpose that Julian identifies 
relates to the cultivation of a sense of dread. 
 Not surprisingly, Julian's thinking on dread is inseparable from the theme of doubles.  
The very nature of the soul's constitution as both sensual and substantial necessitates the activity 
of both dread and love in the soul's return to God.  Julian identifies the reconciliation of the 
soul's sensuality and substance as an element of the return to God and in the process of 
reconciliation, in which each moves into the other, two basic errors may arise:  despair and 
presumption.  In the soul's expanding awareness of its sensual nature, by grace, the soul may be 
overwhelmed by its sinfulness and begin to doubt in God's goodness and might to accomplish 
the soul's salvation.  Julian identifies this as a quality of doubtful dread which leads to despair 
(16:74:13).  This type of dread is unhealthy to the soul and God's will is to transform this dread 
                                                 
57Origen as quoted by John Sachs in "Apocatastasis in patristic theology." Theological Studies 54/4 (Dec 1993) 
623. 
 82
into love that once again recognizes God's good intent for the soul.   
 On the other hand, as the soul further realizes its substantial nature, again by grace, the 
soul becomes aware of its enclosure in the love of God and may be tempted to presumption, 
which is a recklessness that presumes upon God's boundless love by making this love an 
occasion for license.  At this point it is healthy for the soul to experience dread.  This occurs by 
becoming reacquainted with an awareness of how the soul, in itself, is completely vulnerable 
and cannot know the extent of its sinfulness nor how it might next succumb to sin (16:79:12-
14).  Knowing our feebleness is the other side of knowing God's lordship in the sense that 
aquaintance with our weakness leads to awareness of the extent to which we depend on God for 
salvation.  This awareness has the quality of dread. 
 Julian writes that love and dread are brothers (16:74:20) and that one should not be had 
without the other (16:74:29).  The two relate to a double vision of God.  The knowing of God as 
good arouses love, while the knowing of God as the Lord on whom the soul depends inspires 
dread.   A sense of how the two work together may be found in examining the affects of dread 
when it is healthy.  Julian calls the dread holy that "makyth vs to hastely fle fro all all that is nott 
goode and falle into oure lordes brest, as the chylde in to the moders arme"(16:74:34-35).  
Dread describes the experience that results in flight:  an awareness of evil and feebleness.  Love 
is the recognition that God is the source of all good and that God, like a mother, yearns to 
protect and comfort the fearful soul.  Love gives the flight direction, orienting the soul to take 
refuge in God.  Love without dread leads to presumption while dread without love leads to 
despair. 
 Pastorally, Julian's showings and the Church teaching on damnation are mutually 
supportive.  The showings of divine love provide a sense of direction and inspire the soul with 
hope and confidence for the journey.  Julian does not refute Church teaching, primarily because 
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of her love and obedience to the Church, but Julian also recognizes that  the Church teaching on 
the possibility of damnation inspires a quality of dread that pertains to the seriousness of the 
journey of return to God.  In order to guard against arrogant recklessness, awareness of God's 
love must be balanced by awareness of the human propensity to turn away from God.   
 
The Communal Nature of Salvation 
 The question may remain concerning the extent to which Julian's love for the Church and 
obedience to its teachings held her back from pursuing the full soteriological implications of her 
showings.  However, it should also be noted that Julian's showings  inform her very ecclesiology 
in such a way that the tension between Church teaching on damnation and her showings 
concerning sin and salvation is given one more arena in which to play. 
 Often Julian's soteriology is discussed with little reference to her ecclesiology, except to 
note her anxiety concerning the contrast between her showings and Church teaching.  This is a 
grave mistake insofar as Julian tends to avoid considering salvation in terms of the pursuit of an 
isolated individual.  Indeed, for Julian the individual Christian is inconceivable apart from the 
body of the Church.  The extent to which Julian identifies the individual Christian with the body 
of believers may be found in the parallel that Julian draws between looking into the heart of the 
Church and looking into one's own soul (14:62:25).  Julian implies that looking into the heart of 
the Church is nothing less than looking into one's own soul.  In fact the vision is even grander 
for Julian also writes that the Church is at the heart of creation such that the diverse natures of 
all creatures may be found comprehended in the body of the Church.  The diverse natures of all 
creatures flow out from God and are restored to God through the salvation of humankind 
(14:62:25).  In the salvation story of the Church is thus comprehended the salvation of every 
individual who is to be saved as well as the restoration of creation, in all its diversity, to the one 
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God. 
 The communal nature of salvation involves a measure of security for the individual soul.  
The individual is bound to fall and be broken over and over, but the Church, as a whole, is never 
broken.  The individual is thus wise to attach herself to the body of the Church, which is the 
body of Christ (14:61:59-63).  There is a sense here in which the constant virtue of the body of 
believers is participated in by the individual whose virtue is inconstant. 
 To use a term that Julian favours, the love of God is the force that knits each person to 
another.  This knitting is such that "no man can parte them selfe from other" (15:62:19-20).
 As much as the love of God knits the soul to Godself, so does this love accomplish a 
oneing among humans.  In this oneing a type of rapprochement occurs between the high and the 
low such that the highest are able to see themselves needy with the lowest and the lowest may 
be comforted with the highest (16:78:28,29).    The parallel between the nature of the Church 
and the nature of the soul becomes explicit here in a pattern of redemption.  In the same way 
that grace is mutually communicated between the high substance and the low sensuality of the 
soul, so in the Church each communicates grace to the other in the onening that God's love 
accomplishes between diverse kinds.  The higher comes down to the lower “of the kynde loue of 
the selfe by grace” (14:52:87).  This love is kynde because it makes the lower like the higher.  
The higher and the lower are no longer separated, but are the “doubyll werkyng” of one loue 
(14:52:90). 
 The sense in which all shall be well takes on a slightly different connotation in light of 
Julian's ecclesiology.  The all could possibly be seen as the body of the Church.  Julian says of 
herself that as a singular being she is nothing, but that in general, with all other Christians, in the 
oneness by which God knits Christians together, she has her being (1:9:9,10).  It is possible to 
conclude from this that the all refers to the general body of believers, from which one could 
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potentially exclude oneself and fall into non-existence.  More likely, the all could refer to the 
entirety of creation as it is knitted together into a knot by the love of God.  In this latter sense, 
the Church acts as a sacrament to the world and the medium through which all shall be well.  
The ambiguity here perhaps reflects the general tension between Church teaching and the 
showings.  It is nonetheless worthwhile to note that while Church teaching may have caused 
Julian to hesitate to express the full extent of her hope in the salvation of all, the very manner in 
which Julian experiences and thinks about the Church itself after the showings expresses a hope 
in the extension of salvation from those most close to God in the Church outwards to an 
undetermined generality. 
 
The Hye Marveyle 
 Following an analysis of the range of often contradictory opinions that Origen expressed 
on the matter of salvation, Crouzel concludes that with regard to the universality of 
apokatastasis, or restoration, the most that can be said is that Origen hoped for it58.  Crouzel 
suggests that systematic thinking, especially on divine realities, is unable to “grasp the 
antitheses that express the real.”  Origen is thus to be praised for not attempting to “reach God 
by a system” and for being unashamed to grope “in the dark places of the faith.”59  In this regard 
Julian too is to be praised for not simplistically and prematurely reducing the tensions and 
contradictions that she encounters in her fidelity to both Church teaching and her showings.  
Julian's refusal to choose between the two, suggests neither indecision nor hesitancy due to fear 
of condemnation, but rather a sense of the fruitfulness of doubleness and its consequent 
tensions.   
 Hans Urs Von Balthasar writes, "When we come to the question of judgment and 
                                                 
58Henri Crouzel, Origen.  Worrall, A.S..  (Edinburgh:  T. & T. Clark, 1989) 265. 
59Ibid, 266. 
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redemption, we are at the inexpressible limits."60 Julian goes to the inexpressible limits, to the 
"dark places of the faith," and in the end she is to be praised for her respect for the darkness.  
There is little doubt that Julian hopes for the salvation of all, but she declines to convert this 
hope into a doctrinal formulation.  Julian respects the inexpressible and nowhere is this more 
obviously apparent than in the fact that Julian's hope for the salvation of all is most powerfully 
expressed in reference to the unknown:  the "hye marveyle." 
 Julian's showings ultimately culminate in a sense of marvel or wonder.  The deed by 
which salvation is accomplished is described as "mervelous" (13:36:2) and it is beheld in heaven 
in "marvelous joy" (13:36:11).  Julian's marvelling is due in part to her realization that the deed 
is done by God "and I shalle do ryght nought but synne; and my synne shall nott lett his goodnes 
workyng" (13:36:6,7).  The manner in which God works bewilders Julian and her marvel is a 
grateful delight that the human failure to do anything but sin finally cannot prevent the 
unfolding of salvation.   
 In the midst of Julian's delighted marvelling, her thoughts turn to the "the reprovyd" 
(13:36:45) and she reflects that in such moments Jesus gently turns one's gaze back to himself, 
the saviour.  In the return to the contemplation of the saviour, Julian writes that the 
accomplishment of salvation by the saviour is to be taken "for the generall man, yett it excludyth 
nott the specyalle; for what oure good lorde wylle do by his poure creatures, it is now vnknown 
to me"(13:36:51-53).  My earlier comment about the possibility for the individual soul to be 
excluded from the salvation extended to the general body of the Church seems to be disputed 
here.  Julian hangs back from saying anything definitive on the matter and concludes that the 
fate of the reproved is finally unknown to her.  However, it must be noted that the unknown for 
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Julian is an occasion for hope as she indicated earlier in the same chapter in saying that we 
should delight in God "for all that he shewyth and for all that he hydyth" (13:36:31).    
 The hidden is indeed a source of hope for Julian.  While her showings never fully reveal 
how all shall be well, Julian is given intimations of the coming accomplishment of a great deed 
that is distinct from the deed of salvation that Julian is given to see (13:36:54ff.).  Throughout 
Julian's showings she continues to return to contemplations of the great deed referring to it as a 
"hye marveyle" (14:46:49).  Julian writes that the deed will be hidden in both heaven and earth 
until it is done, but this doesn't prevent Julian from marvelling about the nature of the deed.  In 
the subsequent paragraph Julian turns to a discourse on miracles.  She refers to miracles as 
"mervelous" which is noteworthy insofar as mervelous and marveyle are words that are 
repeatedly associated with the great deed.  Miracles for Julian represent the divine surprises that 
emerge out of sorrow and trouble. Arguably then, Julian's intent in introducing the discourse on 
miracles immediately following her mention of the great but unknown deed is to suggest that it 
is possible that the great deed will upset our current expectations concerning the fate of those 
who now suffer under unrelieved slavery to sin. 
 The "hye marveyle" refers to the great deed, but, significantly, Julian also uses this 
precise term to refer to the showing that she is given that there is no forgiveness in God because 
there is no wrath in God (14:49:1ff.).  God doesn't hold any sin against the soul and so, 
ultimately, it is not entirely meaningful to speak of God's forgiveness.  In God's sight 
forgiveness is unnecessary and this is a marvel because of the radical difference between the 
way that God sees the soul and the way that the soul sees itself in its propensity to sin.  The use 
of the term "hye marveyle" for both the great deed and the absence of wrath in God has obvious 
connotations.  
 The sense of marvel that is the consummation of Julian's showings is not intended to be 
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understood as the luxury or special grace of a solitary mystic.  To the contrary, Julian asserts 
that "to reverently marveyle" belongs to the soul as one of two debts (14:47:1,2).  The soul's 
marvelling centres on the absence of wrath in God.  Interestingly, the second debt of the soul is 
to "meekly suffer, evyr enjoyeng in God"(14:47:2).  These two debts recall the theme of doubles 
in every respect.  The substance and sensuality of the soul; God's vision and the soul's vision of 
itself; and the necessity of both love and dread to combat despair and presumption all pertain to 
the two debts of the soul.  The union with God in the substance of our souls, God's loving vision 
of us and our response of love to God all relate to the sense of marvel that by nature belongs to 
the soul.  On the other hand, the propensity to sin of the sensual aspect of the soul, the 
knowledge of ourselves as broken, and the consequent dread each relate to the inevitable 
suffering of the soul which Julian insists must be rejoicingly endured.  Another double is 
suggested here and that is the necessity of beholding both the "hye marveyle" and the teaching 
of the Church.  Arguably, Julian implies that the teaching of the Church relates to one very real 
aspect of the double vision which is that we are sinners deserving wrath while the hye marveyle 
relates to the fact that there is nonetheless an absence of wrath in God. 
 Exploration of Julian's references to the hye marveyle, suggest a radical hope for the 
salvation of all.  Julian clearly has intimations of the nature of the unknown great deed, but in 
finally leaving it as a mystery Julian retains her hope as a hope rather than a doctrinal 
formulation.  Further, Julian's text is by no means unambiguous or even entirely consistent in 
terms of how she attempts to resolve the tensions or antitheses of the dual beholdings that run 
through her text.  While she hopes for the salvation of all, she also clearly believes in the reality 
of hell and considers the possibility for the soul to refuse God even as much as this implies a 
refusal of the soul's own being.  In the end Julian is  left with the tensions that she prayed would 
be reconciled.  However, Julian's showings  finally offer her a new experience of the lacuna, the 
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